Virus immune computer system and method

ABSTRACT

A method and apparatus prevents hacker code from infecting an application program by requiring decryption of the application program prior to running the application program on a computer. The method includes steps of: providing a storage device that is a separate unit from components necessary to operate the computer; storing a symmetric private key on the storage device; using the symmetric private key to produce an encrypted application program upon first installation; thereafter decrypting that part of the encrypted application program needed implement a command to run the application program; precluding the computer from running any part of the application program that has not been first encrypted with the symmetric private key; and, decrypting, on the fly, only those follow-on parts of the encrypted application program needed to perform functions called for during operation of the application program.

TECHNICAL FIELD

In the field of information security, a system and method is disclosedto prevent the execution of hacker code on a computer, improving thefunction, operation, and security of data on the computer.

BACKGROUND ART

Currently, computer programs (executable code) are configured to beexecuted in a specific operating system and an executable code for aspecific operating system can be executed in any machine running thatspecific operating system.

Therefore, any piece of executable code, malicious or not, for specificoperating system will be executed in any computer running that operatingsystem. It is done this way to enable a single program (executablecode), to be written once and executed in any machine running the sameoperating system. This is the currently in use mechanism which lays inthe core of currently in-use computer technology (hardware/software),which we use in our everyday lives.

The vast majority of living humans in every nation of the world uses acomputer of some sort, every single day—be it in the form of a servercomputer, a laptop computer, a desktop computer, a cellphone, a padcomputer or any device which make the use of computer technology:hardware and software.

In the developed world, most humans are so dependent on computers,helping us with all kind of tasks in our daily lives, that most cannotfunction properly without a computer's help. Many are not now able totravel from one city's location to another without the use of electronicmaps in our mobile devices.

Most of the computer programs (software applications or justapplications) used are for our wellbeing, and we all are glad for theirexistences. But there are other kinds of adverse applications that areprogrammed for the single purpose, to create havoc and disruption in ourdaily lives. And they are called computer viruses, computer worms,adware, fishing software, ransomware, etc. (each such adverseapplication may be referred to herein as hacker code, a computer virus,or a virus).

In cryptography, encryption is the process of encoding a message orinformation in such a way that only authorized parties can access it.Encryption does not in itself prevent interference, but denies theintelligible content to a would-be interceptor. In an encryption scheme,the intended information or message, referred to as plaintext, isencrypted using an encryption algorithm, generating cipher-text that canonly be read, if decrypted.

For technical reasons, an encryption scheme usually uses a pseudo-randomencryption key generated by an algorithm. It is in principle possible todecrypt the message without possessing the key, but, for a well-designedencryption scheme, considerable computational resources and skills arerequired, which sometimes, can take a great length of time in the numberof many years of computational prowess using very expensive and powerfulcomputers, which in many cases, is not feasible or economicallypossible. But on the other hand, an authorized message recipientpossessing the decryption key can easily decrypt the message using thekey supplied by the originator/message's sender to the messagerecipient.

Basically, encryption is a form for hiding a message as not to make itsactual/original content available to an intermediary which is notsupposed to know the actual message/content. For instance, if themessage would have been: “9”, and the pre-agreed upon method was tomultiply the value of “7” to the message before it was sent, then once“7” is multiplied to “9” the result will be “63”. Anyone reading thismessage will not know that the actual value is “9”, but once the intendrecipient receives the value “63” all that will be needed will be todivide the received value “7” by “63”, and the result will be “9”—theoriginal value.

Of course, this example is very simplistic, but it gives an idea howencryption works. In an actual computer encryption, very sophisticatedmethod is used. Some uses the computer's logical functions orsophisticated mathematical algorithm. Encryption algorithm, schema ormethods will not be explained here, since it is beyond the scope of thepresent invention. And any kind of available encryption mechanism in usetoday or to be invented in the future can be used to achieve the purposeof encrypting a non-encoded software code and to decrypt an encryptedone. But for the sake of clarity, a more complex format which computeruses will be explained shortly.

Software installation of the prior art—the behavior of the operatingsystem (120) of the present invention is also different from the priorart's operating systems of the prior art currently in use. With theprior art operating systems, the operating system gets an un-encryptedsoftware code and installs it on the computer by creating all therequired procedures for its later execution, then saving it unencryptedon the computer's non-transitory storage.

Software execution of the prior art—when a request arrives in thecomputer where the unencrypted software is installed, the operatingsystem simply reads it and the central processing unit executes it,thus, finalizing the process.

Computer infection of the prior art—since any program once installed inthe computer of the prior art is in a single format, then a virus willbe installed and executed the same as any other program. Usually thevirus is introduced without the user's or the operating system'sknowledge.

In virus execution under the prior art, the central processing unit doesnot distinguish what kind of software code being executed, it may be agood code (an accounting software) or a bad code (a virus), andtherefore, a virus will be executed the same way as any other program.

SUMMARY OF INVENTION

A method prevents hacker code from infecting an application program byrequiring decryption of the application program prior to running theapplication program on a computer. The method includes steps of:providing a storage device that is a separate unit from componentsnecessary to operate the computer; storing a symmetric private key onthe storage device; using the symmetric private key to produce anencrypted application program upon first installation, such that aftersuch first installation, the encrypted application program is the onlyinstalled version of the application program on the computer; thereafterloading the encrypted application program into the random access memoryof the computer; decrypting that part of the encrypted applicationprogram needed implement a command to run the application program;precluding the computer from running any part of the application programthat has not been first encrypted with the symmetric private key; and,decrypting, on the fly, only those follow-on parts of the encryptedapplication program needed to perform functions called for duringoperation of the application program.

Optional steps include: producing a modulus value by causing the centralprocessing unit to perform a modulus operand using between an addressbus value and a length of the symmetric private key to derive aremainder, using the remainder to locate a byte location of thesymmetric private key; using the modulus value to point to a byte valuein the symmetric private key; and requiring the central processing unitto use the byte value for decryption of any follow-on parts of theencrypted application program needed to perform functions called forduring operation of the application program.

Additional optional steps include: receiving a hacker code on thecomputer, the hacker code containing a non-encrypted softwareinstruction that if executed would implement an unwanted operationalcommand; retaining the hacker code only in the random access memory ofthe computer along with the encrypted application program; receiving arequest from the central processing unit to execute the non-encryptedsoftware instruction of the hacker code stored in the random accessmemory of the computer; decrypting the non-encrypted softwareinstruction of the hacker code using the symmetric private key, saiddecrypting producing a non-functional software instruction; andterminating the attempted execution of the non-functional softwareinstruction.

Additional optional steps include: preventing access to the symmetricprivate key after the symmetric private key is successfully used toproduce the encrypted application program, unless express authorizationis first obtained; limiting the storage device to a microchip integratedinto a motherboard of the computer, said microchip not having adedicated central processing unit; preventing access to the symmetricprivate key by producing and sending an automated signal from anoperating system of the computer to the storage device, by acting onmanual input by a user at said computer, by automatically using atristate switch, or by causing the operating system to change a value ina flag to one recognized as a command to prevent such access.

Additional optional steps include: limiting the non-transitory computerstorage medium of the storage device to an electronic chip or aremovable compact disk.

Additional optional steps include: hosting the storage device in anelectronic chip integrated into the computer; hosting a first-electronictristate switch in the electronic chip; and activating thefirst-electronic tristate switch in order to prevent access to thesymmetric private key.

Additional optional steps include: hosting a second-electronic tristateswitch in the electronic chip; and activating the second-electronictristate switch in order to prevent reading of the symmetric private keyfrom the read-access memory of the computer.

Also disclosed is a storage device to implement the method thatincludes: computer memory installed within a unit that is separate fromcomponents necessary for the operation of the computer; a symmetricprivate key usable for encryption and decryption of a software program,the symmetric private key stored on the computer memory within the unit;a second computer memory that is necessary for operation of the computerfor storing computer code operable to: enable the computer to which theunit is connected to use the symmetric private key to encrypt a softwareprogram upon first installation of the software program and therebycreate a first-encrypted software program; require the computer to usethe symmetric private key upon each startup of the first-encryptedsoftware program to decrypt the first-encrypted software program toproduce a first-decrypted software program; execute the first-decryptedsoftware program on the computer; prevent access to the symmetricprivate key after the symmetric private key is first accessed to producethe first-decrypted software program, unless express authorization isfirst obtained; and preclude running on the computer any softwareprogram that has not been encrypted with the symmetric private key.

Additional storage device limitations include: requiring the computermemory in the storage device to be one of an electronic chip, a computerboard, a wireless communication device, an encrypted and stored in thecomputer's non-transitory computer storage medium, a central processorunit, and a universal serial bus device.

Additional storage device components include: an electronic chipincorporating the unit; an electronic tristate switch in the electronicchip; and the electronic chip configured to activate the electronictristate switch to prevent transfer of the symmetric private key fromthe first non-transitory computer storage medium a second time while theelectronic chip is powered-up.

Alternatively, an alternative storage device is used for storing asecure key and includes: non-transitory computer storage mediuminstalled within a unit that can be operationally connected to acomputer, the unit being separate from components necessary foroperation of the computer; a secure key usable as input data to computercode running on the computer to which the storage device is connected,the secure key stored on the non-transitory computer storage medium;computer code for operation of the computer, the computer code operableto: read the secure key; use the secure key as input data; and preventaccess to the secure key a second time after the secure key is firstaccessed by the computer to run any program.

Optional limitations for the alternative storage device includerequiring the non-transitory computer storage medium to be one of: anelectronic chip, a computer board, a central processing unit, a wirelesscommunication device, and a universal serial bus device.

Additional alternative storage device components include: an electronicchip incorporating the storage device; and an electronic tristate switchin the electronic chip; wherein the electronic tristate switch isconfigured to prevent access to the secure key a second time.

A second alternative storage device is configured to decrypt softwarecode stored in a random access memory of a computer and to prevent ahacker code injection into a running process in a computer. The secondalternative storage device includes: non-transitory computer storagemedium, a central processing unit, a data bus, and an address bus; thenon-transitory computer storage medium comprising a key usable fordecrypting encrypted program code stored in the random access memory,the key comprising a plurality of bytes wherein each byte in theplurality of bytes has a byte value; the central processing unitconnected to random access memory through the data bus and the addressbus; the central processing unit is programmed to: identify a designatedlocation in the random access memory; fetch an encrypted byte from thedesignated location stored in the random access memory of the computer;perform a modulus operand between the byte value of the encrypted byteand a length of the key to derive a remainder value; when the remaindervalue is zero, fetch the byte value of a last byte in the plurality ofbytes of the key; when the remainder value is non-zero value, fetch thebyte value of the byte in the plurality of bytes of the key, said bytelocated at the non-zero value; use the byte value that is fetched todecrypt the encrypted byte fetched from the designated location at theread-access memory producing a decrypted byte; and, use the decryptedbyte.

An alternative method discloses steps for controlling loading ofmultiple operating systems into a random access memory of a computer.These steps include: storing a key on the first non-transitory computerstorage medium; storing an encrypted operating system on the computer inthe second non-transitory computer storage medium; storing anon-encrypted operating system on the computer in the thirdnon-transitory computer storage medium; setting a switch to enable thebasic input/output system to load either the encrypted operating systemor the non-encrypted operating system into the random access memory; andconfiguring the computer at power up to implement steps comprising:making the key available from the first non-transitory computer storagemedium to the basic input/output system; when the switch is set toenable the basic input/output system to load the encrypted operatingsystem, the basic input/output system reading the encrypted operatingsystem from the second non-transitory computer storage medium and usingthe key to decrypt the encrypted operating system as requested by thecentral processing unit; and, when the switch is set to enable the basicinput/output system to load the non-encrypted operating system from thethird non-transitory computer storage medium, the basic input/outputsystem disabling access to the key then reading the non-encryptedoperating system from the third non-transitory computer storage medium,then storing the non-encrypted operating system in the random accessmemory of the computer.

Technical Problem

Any piece of executable code programmed for one operating system will beable to run in any computer processing the operating system, and acomputer virus designed to be executed in one operating system (e.g.MICROSOFT WINDOWS) will run in any computer running the WINDOWSoperating system. And, if the executable code happens to be a virus,once it is programmed using a computer running WINDOWS, it will run inany computer with the WINDOWS operating system.

The reason that this happen is for the archaic way that operating systemfunctions, it will not distinguish between a bad and good executablecode.

Computer virus take advantage of this flaw, causing billions of dollarsin loss around the globe and at present, no solution is available tostop their spread. When a virus infects one computer, it can easilyinfect any number of other computers, spreading from computer tocomputer. Then in many times, the infected computers are used to performa coordinated cyberattack at a specific location denial ofservice—denial of service), server computer or website.

With the passing of time, hackers have become more and more prominentglobally and they are always in search for means to cause the greatestdamage possible. And once a compromised server falls to a hacker'shandiwork, the loss of data and intellectual property of the compromisedserver sometimes reaches into the millions of dollars. In some cases, ahacker's code can bring down an organization. And other times, it iscapable of influencing politically—possibly changing the course ofelections and the freedom of society.

Hacker code is introduced into a computer by a cyberattack, directhacking, phishing, etc., on the daily basis around the world. Hackercode can cause a disruption in the political process. One example ofsuch disruption is the theft and release of information pertaining tothe U.S. Democratic Party, which was reportedly done to influence the USPresidential Election of 2016.

A number of global cyberattacks, introducing hacker code in the form of“ransomware” has reportedly crippled government and business operationacross 74 countries. Once a computer is infected with ransomware, thevirus encrypts the files of the infected computer. Then, the hackerscontrolling the ransomware, demand to be paid to restore the infectedcomputer.

Presently, the way to deal with computer viruses is by creating anantivirus software which inspects the computer's behaviors while workingin conjunction with the computer's operating system, inspecting fileswhen they are created, opened and read. For an antivirus to work, itfirst needs to have the virus structure and this is only possible afterit becomes well know and after it had already spread to, and damagedmany computers.

Antivirus software is of little use in preventing modern computerhacking before the first attack occurs. One problem is that once ahacker locates a software flaw running in the compromised computer, thehacker injects the adverse code, in many cases, specially designed forthe compromised computer. Once the code is injected into the runningprocess, the hacker is able to take full control of the computer. Aproblem with existing antivirus programs is that for one to be useful,it needs to scan the computer's memory to locate the invading virus.But, because the way the computer is designed, if any program scans arunning process, that process may crash. Therefore, the antivirus cannotscan a running process. Because, if this is done, and if the runningprocess crashes, the computer becomes a useless machine.

A virus is to a computer what a flu virus is to a human being, andantivirus is to a computer what a flu medicine is to a human.

What is missing from the state of the art and what is needed is, ineffect, a computer virus vaccine. The prior art anti-viral programs arecostly and cumbersome, requiring sophisticated software. They arecomputer medicine which is only effective after the infection or hackinghas already happened.

Solution to Problem

The solution is a method and mechanism in the hardware and at theoperating system level to stop the introduction of the virus in acomputer by enabling each computer to have its own serial code like ahuman DNA, and once the serial code is used by the operating system toencode each piece of executable code, and therefore, a piece of encodedcode from one computer will not execute in another computer, even whenboth computers are running the same piece of software running on thesame operating system. Further, an executable code not having any kindof encoding, like viruses, will not be able to execute in a computerhaving the present invention.

The solution lies in the limitation that only the authorized encryptedversion of a program, namely its digital-DNA, can be executed on thecomputer. This limitation prevents any hacker code or other computerinfection from running on the computer. Securing the computer in suchway is not currently possible. And in the process offering thecomputer's owner peace of mind. The device and method disclosed willsave a great deal of money in human resources devoted to computersecurity and in expenditures for all manner of antivirus software whichwill not now be needed by the computer owner.

Preferred methods and devices disclosed herein enable the protection ofany kind of computing device at a low cost without slowing the device'sfunctioning. It stops the running of injected code into a runningsoftware, and it also stops the running of computer virus of any kind.Preferred methods and devices disclosed herein are a computer vaccine,which stops virus infection and computer hacking before they happen.

Advantageous Effects of Invention

The present invention involves a hardware and software combination toencrypt/decrypt executable computer software code as to inhibit a codenot part of the computer from being executed in the computer, thus,disabling the spread of all sorts computer virus and hacking by notallowing a foreign piece of software code to be installed or executed inthe computer in the first place.

The methods and devices disclosed enable the user to avoid the expensescurrently associated with antivirus software and other hacker preventionmethods or devices which may currently be necessary to prevent a virusor unwanted code from executing in any kind computer (personal, desktop,server, mobile, etc.): It has important uses for any network computer(wired, wireless, Internet, server, etc.) running any kind of OperatingSystem (Window™, Unix, Linux™, Apple™ Operating Systems, etc.).

Unlike current generation antivirus technology which may only becomeeffective after the virus has already spread infecting and damaging manycomputers, the methods and devices disclosed herein prevent a computervirus from becoming an operable part of the computer by disabling itbefore it can cause any damage to the computer.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF DRAWINGS

The drawings illustrate preferred embodiments of the Virus immunecomputer system and method according to the disclosure. The referencenumbers in the drawings are used consistently throughout. New referencenumbers in FIG. 2 are given the 200 series numbers. Similarly, newreference numbers in each succeeding drawing are given a correspondingseries number beginning with the figure number.

FIG. 1A illustrates the circuitry of thedevice-with-encryption-decryption-key.

FIG. 1B illustrates the saving of a new encryption/decryption key intothe device-with-encryption-decryption-key's circuitry.

FIG. 2A illustrates a computer's operating system using theencryption/decryption key device.

FIG. 2B illustrates a further embodiment of FIG. 2A after operatingsystem has read the encryption/decryption key from thedevice-with-encryption-decryption-key at power up then disabling it(device-with-encryption-decryption-key) from the computer as not toallow it to read by any other program.

FIG. 3 illustrates the operating system using the encryption/decryptionkey to encrypt a non-encode program code producing the digital-DNA, thenstoring it on the computer's non-transitory computer storage medium.

FIG. 4 illustrates the operating system using the encryption/decryptionkey to decrypt digital-DNA from FIG. 3.

FIG. 5-6 illustrates the XORing of two values.

FIG. 7 illustrates a computer virus of the prior art.

FIG. 8A illustrates the digital-DNA (encrypted software) of the presentinvention saved in the computer.

FIG. 8B illustrates the decryption of digital-DNA of the presentinvention before it is executed by the central processing unit.

FIG. 8C illustrates stopping the computer virus with the presentinvention.

FIG. 9 illustrates a computer circuitry implementing the presentinvention.

FIG. 10 illustrates the installation process of a newdevice-with-encryption-decryption-key.

FIG. 11 illustrates a flowchart for the device of FIG. 10.

FIG. 12 illustrates a device for restoring the encryption/decryption keyinto a new device-with-encryption-decryption-key.

FIG. 13 illustrates a flowchart for the device of FIG. 12.

FIG. 14 illustrates the invention's implementation with software alone.

FIG. 15 illustrates code injection.

FIG. 16 illustrates the prior art's code execution.

FIG. 17 illustrates code execution stored in a computer random accessmemory of the present invention.

FIG. 18 illustrates the present invention's code execution.

FIG. 19 illustrates the disabling of the hacker's random access memoryinjected code.

FIG. 20 illustrates the loading of the operating system of the priorart.

FIG. 21 illustrates the loading of the main operating system of theinvention.

FIG. 22 illustrates the loading of the operating system from a dongle ofthe invention.

FIG. 23 illustrates the comparison between a human body and a computer.

FIG. 24 diagrams a preferred embodiment of the method for preventing ahacker code from infecting an application program on a computer.

FIG. 25 diagrams optional additional steps the method for preventing ahacker code from infecting an application program on a computer.

FIG. 26 diagrams further optional additional steps the method forpreventing a hacker code from infecting an application program on acomputer.

FIG. 27 diagrams more optional steps the method for preventing a hackercode from infecting an application program on a computer.

FIG. 28 diagrams an alternative process for preventing a hacker codeinfection of a computer operating system.

DESCRIPTION OF EMBODIMENTS

In the following description, reference is made to the accompanyingdrawings, which form a part hereof and which illustrate severalembodiments of the present invention. The drawings and the preferredembodiments of the invention are presented with the understanding thatthe present invention is susceptible of embodiments in many differentforms and, therefore, other embodiments may be utilized and structural,and operational changes may be made, without departing from the scope ofthe present invention.

This description is organized by first presenting a concise disclosureof the methods and devices followed by a more thorough detaileddisclosure with examples.

CONCISE DISCLOSURE

Methods and devices to prevent a hacker code infection of a computer aredisclosed herein. A method (2400) is disclosed for preventing hackercode from infecting an application program on a computer (130). Method2(2800) discloses its use for a computer operating system, which is alsoconsidered an application program. The terms “application program,”‘software application” ‘software application program,” ‘software/driver”and “computer software file” are used interchangeably herein.

The method (2400) requires encrypting a software application, i.e., thenon-encoded software (310)), producing the digital-DNA (300) upon firstinstallation and then requires decryption of the software application(the digital-DNA (300)) prior to each instance of running thenon-encoded software (310)) on the computer. The computer includes anon-transitory computer storage medium; random access memory; a centralprocessing unit; and an operating system. The operating system stored inthe non-transitory computer storage medium of the computer.

The method (2400) includes a providing step (2405); a storing step(2410); a using step (2415); a loading step (2420); a decrypting step(2425); a precluding step (2430); and a requiring step (2435). Themethod (2400) with the aforementioned seven steps is referred to as thebase method that may be performed with other optional steps describedbelow.

The providing step (2405) is providing a storage device comprisingnon-transitory computer storage medium, also referred to as anon-transitory computer storage medium. The storage device may beintegrated into the computer or it may be a separate unit, such as auniversal serial bus device or a mobile device. Whether an independentdongle or a chip integrated into the motherboard of the computer, thestorage device is a separate unit from the components needed to power-upor operate the computer in the sense that if it were removed, thecomputer would be fully functional without it.

The storing step (2410) involves storing a symmetric private key on thestorage device. More specifically, it is storing the symmetric privatekey in the non-transitory computer storage medium in the storage device.The symmetric private key is one or more cryptographic keys andcomprises an algorithm for cryptography. The symmetric private key usesthe same cryptographic keys for both encryption of plaintext anddecryption of ciphertext. The cryptographic keys are preferablyidentical for encryption and decryption. Additionally, there may be asimple transformation to go between the two cryptographic keys. In usesas described herein, the symmetric private key is preferably symmetricin that it is usable for encryption and decryption of an applicationprogram stored in the random access memory of the computer.

The using step (2415) is using the symmetric private key to produce anencrypted application program upon first installation of the applicationprogram on the computer. The encrypted application program includesencrypted operational instructions needed to run the applicationprogram. After such first installation, the encrypted applicationprogram is the only installed version of the application program on thecomputer.

The loading step (2420) occurs upon receiving a command to run theapplication program. When this run command is executed on the computer,the loading step (2420) is performed which involves loading theencrypted application program into the random access memory of thecomputer.

The decrypting step (2425) includes requiring the central processingunit to decrypt that part of the encrypted application program needed toimplement the command to run the application program. The decryptingstep (2425) performs this step using the symmetric private key andapplies it to decrypting of as much of the application program as isneeded to fully implement the run command.

The precluding step (2430) includes precluding the computer from runningany part of the application program that has not been first encryptedwith the symmetric private key. This step prevents the execution of anycode in the application program without that code having been firstdecrypted using the symmetric private key. This ensures that no strayhacker code can be run on the computer because no hacker code is everencrypted. Thus, decryption forces the operational hacker code toundergo the decryption process, which destroys its functionality as anexecutable code.

The requiring step (2435) includes requiring the central processing unitto decrypt, on the fly, only those follow-on parts of the encryptedapplication program needed to perform functions called for duringoperation of the application program. Thus, whenever the applicationrequires code that has not already been decrypted, it draws that codefrom the encrypted application program and decrypts it for use.

Additional optional steps in the method (2400) include a producing step(2505); a pointing step (2510); an incrementing step (2515); a hackingstep (2520); a retaining step (2525); a running step (2530); adestroying step (2535); a terminating step (2540); a disabling step(2605); a limiting step (2610); a key-limiting step (2615); amemory-limiting step (2620); a storage-hosting step (2625); afirst-hosting step (2705); a first-activating step (2710); asecond-hosting step (2715); and a second-activating step (2720).

When the producing step (2505) is added to the method, the producingstep (2505) includes producing a modulus value by causing the centralprocessing unit to perform a modulus operand using between an addressbus value and a length of the symmetric private key to derive aremainder, using the remainder to locate a byte location of thesymmetric private key. When this step is performed, it is preferablyfollowed by the pointing step (2510), which includes using the modulusvalue to point to a byte value in the symmetric private key. Then, whenthe pointing step (2510) is performed, it is preferably followed by theincrementing step (2515), which includes requiring the centralprocessing unit to use the byte value for decryption of any follow-onparts of the encrypted application program needed to perform functionscalled for during operation of the application program.

The hacking step (2520) includes receiving a hacker code on thecomputer, the hacker code containing a non-encrypted softwareinstruction that if executed would implement an unwanted operationalcommand. When this step is performed, it is preferably followed by 4additional steps: The retaining step (2525); the running step (2530);the destroying step (2535); and the terminating step (2540).

The retaining step (2525) includes retaining the hacker code only in therandom access memory of the computer along with the encryptedapplication program. In the present method disclosed, this is thelocation where all application programming code is stored as a predicatefor executing it.

The running step (2530) includes receiving a request from the centralprocessing unit to execute, i.e. to run, the non-encrypted softwareinstruction of the hacker code stored in the random access memory of thecomputer. Such a request is a function of the hacker code and may beuser initiated or be automatically triggered.

The destroying step (2535) includes decrypting the non-encryptedsoftware instruction of the hacker code using the symmetric private key.This step is a direct result of the running step (2530) seeking toexecute the hacker code. The method disclosed requires a decryptionoperation on any executable code. Thus, the retaining step (2525) forcesthe hacker code to undergo a decryption process, thus rendering itinoperable. This steps thus converts hacker code to a non-functionalsoftware instruction.

The terminating step (2540) is the last step in this 5-step supplementto the base method. The terminating step (2540) includes the centralprocessing unit terminating attempted execution of the non-functionalsoftware instruction because it has in fact become non-functional byvirtue of the retaining step (2525).

The disabling step (2605) includes preventing access to the symmetricprivate key after the symmetric private key is successfully used toproduce the encrypted application program, unless express authorizationis first obtained. This disabling step (2605) prevents a hacker codefrom gaining access to the symmetric private key to circumvent themethod by encrypting the hacker code and forcing its storage in therandom access memory.

The limiting step (2610) includes limiting the storage device to amicrochip integrated into a motherboard of the computer, said microchipnot having a dedicated central processing unit. Thus, the invention canbe implemented by having an integrated circuit in the motherboard of thecomputer. Such integrated circuit would still be required to meet theother limitations for the storage device, just that it would be formedwithin as a non-removable component.

The key-limiting step (2615) specifies preferred alternate procedureswith which access to the symmetric private key can be prevented frombeing accessed. The key-limiting step (2615) includes preventing accessto the symmetric private key by implementing a procedure selected fromthe group consisting of: producing and sending an automated signal froman operating system of the computer to the storage device; acting onmanual input by a user at said computer; automatically using a tristateswitch; and causing the operating system or the microchip to change avalue in a flag to one recognized as a command to prevent such access.

The memory-limiting step (2620) includes limiting the non-transitorycomputer storage medium of the storage device to non-transitory computerstorage medium selected from the group consisting of an electronic chip,and a removable compact disk.

The storage-hosting step (2625) includes hosting the storage device inan electronic chip integrated into the computer, the electronic chipfurther comprising read-access memory

The first-hosting step (2705) includes hosting a first-electronictristate switch in the electronic chip. When this step is performed itis preferably followed by a first—activating step (2710). Thefirst-activating step (2710) includes activating the first-electronictristate switch in order to prevent access to the symmetric private key.Such activation may be manual, such as user activated, or automatic byoperation of electronic timing trigger to the first-electronic tristateswitch.

When the first-hosting step (2705) and the first-activating step (2710)are performed, then preferably the method may further include thesecond-hosting step (2715) and the second-activating step (2720). Thesecond-hosting step (2715) includes hosting a second-electronic tristateswitch in the electronic chip. The second-activating step (2720)includes activating the second-electronic tristate switch in order toprevent reading of the symmetric private key from the read-access memoryof the computer.

A similar process is described in FIG. 28 as applicable to protect acomputer operating system. Method2 (2800) is a process for controllingloading of multiple operating systems into a random access memory of acomputer (130).

The computer (130) includes three memory storage devices: afirst-non-transitory computer storage medium (104), a secondnon-transitory computer storage medium (350), a third non-transitorycomputer storage medium (2100). The computer (130) further includes arandom access memory (925), a central processing unit (905), a basicinput/output system (2130), and a first switch (2105) and a secondswitch (2135). A single switch may be implemented instead of two whichwill provide the same functionality, if the single switch is open thenload one operating system, when the single switch is closed then loadthe other operating system.

Method2 (2800) includes seven steps: a storing-key step (2805); astoring-EOS step (2810); a storing-NEOS step (2815); a setting-switchstep (2820); a configuring-computer step (2825); a key-available step(2830); a reading/using step (2835); and a disabling/storing step(2840).

The storing-key step (2805) includes storing a key on thefirst-non-transitory computer storage medium (104), the key usable forencryption and decryption of a software program. The key is a symmetrickey in that it is usable for encryption and decryption steps. Theoperating system is considered a software program for this method2(2800).

The storing-EOS step (2810) includes storing an encrypted operatingsystem on the computer (130) in the second non-transitory computerstorage medium (350). The operating system is encrypted using the key.

The storing-NEOS step (2815) includes storing a non-encrypted operatingsystem on the computer (130) in the third non-transitory computerstorage medium (2100).

The setting-switch step (2820) includes setting the switch to enable thebasic input/output system (2130) to load either the encrypted operatingsystem or the non-encrypted operating system into the random accessmemory. Preferably, the switch is a manual switch or an electronicswitch. Once first switch (2105) is opened and second switch (2135) isclosed, the encrypted operating system is loaded (FIG. 21). Once firstswitch (2105) is closed and second switch (2135) is opened, thenon-encrypted operating system is loaded (FIG. 22). Instead of twoswitches as depicted, a single switch may be used where if opened willload a first operating system, and if closed, will load a secondoperating system.

The configuring-computer step (2825) includes configuring the computer(130) at power up to implement three steps: The key-available step(2830); the reading/using step (2835); and the disabling/storing step(2840).

The key-available step (2830) includes making the key available from thefirst-non-transitory computer storage medium (104) to the basicinput/output system (2130).

The reading/using step (2835) is performed when the switch is set toenable the basic input/output system (2130) to load the encryptedoperating system, the basic input/output system (2130) reading theencrypted operating system from the second non-transitory computerstorage medium (350) and using the encryption/decryption key (103) todecrypt the encrypted operating system as requested by the centralprocessing unit.

The disabling/storing step (2840) is performed when the switch is set toenable the basic input/output system (2130) to load the non-encryptedoperating system from the third non-transitory computer storage medium(2100). The basic input/output system (2130) disables access to the keythen reads the non-encrypted operating system from the thirdnon-transitory computer storage medium (2100), then stores thenon-encrypted operating system in the random access memory (925) of thecomputer (130). The operating system is preferably stored in itsencrypted form into the random access memory (925) and once implementedthis way the central processing unit (905) will decrypt the encryptedoperating system as the central processing unit (905) fetches theencrypted operating system from the random access memory (925).

A preferred device that implements the methods disclosed herein is astorage device in the sense that it comprises first-non-transitorycomputer storage medium (104) storing an encryption/decryption key(103), which may be referred to herein as an EDK. The storage device maybe referred to herein as a DEDK or adevice-with-encryption-decryption-key (100).

The device-with-encryption-decryption-key (100) may be in the form ofany peripheral or built in device, including as examples, an electronicmicrochip, a computer (130), a computer board/blade, a removable storagemedium, a universal serial bus device, a circuit within the computer'scentral processing unit, or a mobile device connectible via BLUETOOTH,etc.

The purpose of the device-with-encryption-decryption-key (100) is toimprove the functioning and operation of the computer (130) by providingthe computer (130) with the means to block operability of a hacker'scode (1550) that would otherwise be operable once injected into softwareprogram, i.e. once injected into the digital-DNA (300), installed on thecomputer (130). The device-with-encryption-decryption-key (100) providesimmunity from an otherwise operable software viral infection after thefirst installation of the software program (330) on the computer (130).Use of the device-with-encryption-decryption-key (100) preventsoperability on the computer (130) of any memory software code injectionsubsequent to first installation of the software program (330).

The encryption/decryption key (103) is a symmetric private key usablefor encryption and decryption of a software program (330). Thissymmetric private key is stored on the non-transitory computer storagemedium, which for purposes of distinguishing it from other memory isreferred to as a first-non-transitory computer storage medium (104) thatis installed within a unit (namely, a housing) that is separate fromcomponents necessary for the operation of the computer (130). Thefirst-non-transitory computer storage medium (104) is a component partof the DEDK. The first-non-transitory computer storage medium (104) isnot necessary for the operation of the computer (130).

The computer (130) includes a second non-transitory computer storagemedium (350). This second non-transitory computer storage medium (350),unlike the first-non-transitory computer storage medium (104), isnecessary for operation of the computer (130). The second non-transitorycomputer storage medium (350) is used for storing computer code operableto accomplish at least 5 tasks:

A first task is to enable the computer (130) to which the unit isconnected to use the symmetric private key, namely theencryption/decryption key (103), to encrypt a software program (330)upon first installation of the software program (330) and thereby createa first-encrypted software program, termed and referred to herein asDigital-DNA (300).

FIG. 8A relates to FIG. 3, and illustrates an example of a preferredembodiment where the encrypted software file stored in the storagemedium, the second non-transitory computer storage medium (350) shown inFIG. 3, of the computer (130). The operating system (120) holds a copyof the encryption/decryption value of “0123456789” (in memory location(120-A)), which is used to encrypt the software program (330) whichincludes the optional header identifier code (320) and the non-encodedsoftware (310). The executable program, i.e. the non-encoded software(310), may be referred to as the good executable software and thenon-encoded software (310). Encryption of the software program (330)produces the digital-DNA (300), then saving the digital-DNA (300) intothe second non-transitory computer storage medium (350), shown in FIG.3, of the computer (130).

A second task is to require the computer (130) to use the symmetricprivate key, namely the encryption/decryption key (103), upon eachstartup of the first-encrypted software program, namely the digital-DNA(300), to decrypt the digital-DNA (300) (i.e., the first-encryptedsoftware program), to produce a first-decrypted software program, whichis the same as non-encoded software (310) and theoptional-header-identification-code (320) that is decrypted.

FIG. 8B relates to FIG. 4, and is an example of the second task, whichis essentially the reversal of the first task shown in FIG. 8A. Afterthe operating system (120) loads the digital-DNA (300), the operatingsystem (120) decrypts the digital-DNA (300) using the value in memorylocation (120-A) of the encryption/decryption key (103) to derive theoriginal software code, namely the non-encoded software (310). Then, thecentral processing unit (905) executes (runs) the non-encoded software(310) in the random access memory (925) of the computer (130). And thecentral processing unit (905) of the computer (130), fetches the byte ofthe non-encoded software (310)), one at a time, forprocessing/execution.

A third task is to execute the first-decrypted software program on thecomputer (130).

The first three tasks can be summarized as the operating system (120)encrypting at installation time of a software program to produce thefirst-encrypted software program, i.e. the digital-DNA (300) or theencrypted software program. The operating system then saving thedigital-DNA (300) (i.e., the first-encrypted software program, as shownin (FIG. 8A)). Then, the operating system at runtime of the softwareprogram decrypts the digital-DNA reproducing the non-encoded software(310) that the operating system/central processing unit understands, andthen executes the non-encoded software (310) (FIG. 8B).

A fourth task is to prevent access to the symmetric private key afterthe symmetric private key is first accessed to produce thefirst-decrypted software program, unless express authorization is firstobtained.

This fourth task prevents software of any kind having a direct access tothe device-with-encryption-decryption-key (100). Access preventioneliminates the possibility that a hacker's code (1550) could be writtenwith the specific purpose to read the encryption/decryption key (103) onthe device-with-encryption-decryption-key (100), or to save a fakeencryption/decryption key thereon for the purpose of defeating thesecurity of the device-with-encryption-decryption-key (100), or to usethe encryption/decryption key (103) to encrypt software code to run inthe computer (130), i.e. hacker's code (1550).

A fifth task is to preclude running on the computer (130) any softwareprogram that has not been encrypted with the symmetric private key. Thistask assures that only encrypted application software is executable onthe computer (130).

In some preferred embodiments, the first-non-transitory computer storagemedium (104) incorporated into a component selected from the groupconsisting of an electronic chip, a computer (130) board, a wirelesscommunication device, i.e. the mobile device (1430), an encryptedencryption/decryption key stored in the computer (130) in the secondnon-transitory computer storage medium (350), a central processor unit,a random access memory auxiliary (952), and a universal serial busdevice.

In one preferred embodiment, the device-with-encryption-decryption-key(100), aka the storage device, aka the DEDK, may be an electronic chipincorporating the unit. In this embodiment, it is also preferable toinclude timer/trigger (105A), which is itself electronic, in theelectronic chip that is configured to activate the electronic tristateswitch (105B) to prevent transfer of the symmetric private key from thefirst-non-transitory computer storage medium (104) a second time to thelatch memory (111) of the device-with-encryption-decryption-key (100)while the electronic chip is powered-up.

Latch memory, also called flip-flops, is a non-transitory electronicstorage medium (memory device) which can store one bit of data for aslong as the device is powered. A latch memory has a set/reset line whichcontrols the setting of, or resetting of, the memory's content, a highor a low signal. While latch memory (111) is used as an example herein,it is intended that any type of non-transitory storage memory that willhold a value and enable the value to be cleared, is an acceptablesubstitute. Since each latch memory (111) stores one bit of data, eightof the latch memory (111) are required for each byte of theencryption/decryption key (103). For example, key_a (110A) requireseight of the latch memory (111) and the same applies to key_b (110B),key_c (110C), and key_z (110D).

An example of this is in FIG. 1A where gate control circuitry (105)comprises a timer/trigger (105A). An electronic tristate switch (105B)acts like any gate in a physical world where it will be closed or open.The electronic tristate switch (105B) acts like a light bulb switchwhich once closed, it lets electricity through the wires lighting thelight bulb, and when opened, it turns off the light bulb. Similarly, theelectronic tristate switch (105B) controls the flow of an electronicsignal going in one direction when it is closed, and disables the flowof the electronic signal when it is open. The timer/trigger (105A) is anelectronic circuitry used to fire a signal once something happens, inthis particular example, a certain amount of time after the computer isturned on or reset—for instance, after a few milliseconds, or perhapsafter a few seconds, or longer.

In an alternative embodiment, a storage device, i.e. a device forstoring a secure key which is used as input to a program running in thecomputer (130) which the device-with-encryption-decryption-key (100) isconnected to. The term “secure key” means any value and includes as anexample the encryption/decryption key (103).

The device-with-encryption-decryption-key (100) includes afirst-non-transitory computer storage medium (104) installed within aunit that can be operationally connected to the computer (130). Whenused herein, “non-transitory computer storage medium” means and includesany computer readable medium that is formed of non-transitory tangiblemedia and does not include transitory propagating signals.

The unit is separate from components necessary for operation of thecomputer (130). In this embodiment, the secure key usable as input datato computer code running on the computer (130) to which the storagedevice is connected, the secure key stored on the first-non-transitorycomputer storage medium (104). In this embodiment, code for operation ofthe computer (130) is operable to: read a copy of secure key, that isthe encryption/decryption key (103) from the latch memory (111) of thedevice-with-encryption-decryption-key (100) and; use the copiedencryption/decryption key (110) as input data; and prevent access to theencryption/decryption key (103) a second time after theencryption/decryption key (103) is first accessed by the computer (130)to run any program.

Optionally, the non-transitory computer storage medium is incorporatedinto a component selected from the group consisting of an electronicchip, a computer (130) board, a central processing unit (905), awireless communication device, i.e. the mobile device (1430), a randomaccess memory auxiliary (952), and a universal serial bus device.

This alternative embodiment may also optionally include an electronicchip incorporating the storage device and an electronic tristate switch(105B) in the electronic chip that is configured to prevent access tothe secure key a second time. In another alternative embodiment, astorage device is configured to decrypt software code stored in a randomaccess memory (925) of the computer (130). The storage device is furtherconfigured to prevent the hacker's code (1550) from being injected intoa running process (1545) in a server (1510). The storage device includesnon-transitory computer storage medium, random access memory, a centralprocessing unit, a data bus, and an address bus. The non-transitorycomputer storage medium includes a key usable for decrypting encryptedprogram code stored in the random access memory. The central processingunit can be the same one needed for the operation of the server (1510)and not necessarily an independent unit only used by the storage device.The key includes a plurality of bytes wherein each byte in the pluralityof bytes has a byte value. The central processing unit is connected torandom access memory through the data bus and the address bus. Thecentral processing unit is programmed to: identify a designated locationin the random access memory addressed by a value at the address bus;fetch an encrypted byte from the designated location stored in therandom access memory of the computer; perform a modulus operand betweenthe random access memory location value at the address bus and a lengthof the key to derive a remainder value; when the remainder value iszero, fetch the byte value of a last byte in the plurality of bytes ofthe key; when the remainder value is non-zero value, fetch the bytevalue of the byte in the plurality of bytes of the key, said bytelocated at the non-zero value; use the byte value that is fetched todecrypt the encrypted byte fetched from the designated location at theread-access memory producing a decrypted byte; and, use the decryptedbyte.

DETAILED DISCLOSURE

Throughout the teachings of this invention will be mentioned that onlythe operating system and/or a driver is able to access anencryption/decryption key, referred to hereinafter asencryption/decryption key (103) and use it, but the term operatingsystem is to be interpreted broadly to cover the operating system andany authorized program like: a driver program, an installer program,login programs, etc. And in this context, the authorized program,instead of the operating system or along with the operating system, willdo the fetching and using of the encryption/decryption key (103).

It will be mentioned that the central processing unit (905) does thedecryption, it is to be broadly interpreted that it includes the centralprocessing unit (905) and any software like the operating system (120)and/or the software driver (935) and hardware like the random accessmemory auxiliary (952) or any hardware which will work in conjunctionwith the central processing unit (905) to realize theencryption/decryption of software in the computer (130) or the server(1510).

Further, at times it will be mentioned the server (1510), and at othertimes the computer (130). But if the server (1510) is mentioned, it isto be broadly interpreted to include the computer (130). If the computer(130) is mentioned, it is to be broadly interpreted to include theserver (1510). The teachings of FIG. 9 is to be broadly interpreted toinclude the server (1510), the computer (130), or any computing devicehaving a central processing unit (905) executing any kind of programcode. The use of the device-with-encryption-decryption-key (100) is tobe broadly interpreted to be used in the server (1510), to be used inthe computer (130), to be used in any computing device having a centralprocessing unit executing any kind of program code.

If specified herein that a step of encryption or decryption is performedwith the encryption/decryption key (103), then this step is intended tobe broadly interpreted to include performance using theencryption/decryption key (103), or using the copy ofencryption/decryption key (120-A). Also, if specified that the processof encryption or decryption is performed with the encryption/decryptionkey (110), then this process is intended to include its performanceusing the encryption/decryption key (103), or using the copy of theencryption/decryption key (120-A).

In preferred embodiments, each computer (130) has anencryption/decryption key (103) of its own. The encryption/decryptionkey (103) may only be accessed from the computer (130) with thedevice-with-encryption-decryption-key (100) by the operating system(120) of the computer (130) at the computer's power up or the reset ofthe computer (130). Once the operating system (120) accesses theencryption/decryption key (103), the operating system (120) clears thecopy of the encryption/decryption key from the latch memory (111) of thedevice-with-encryption-decryption-key (100), so as to prevent anyfurther program access to the device-with-encryption-decryption-key(100) and, thus, any second or subsequent reading of theencryption/decryption key (103).

Preferably, the electronic device-with-encryption-decryption-key (100)holding an encryption/decryption key (103) comprises a mechanism toenable it to make the encryption/decryption key (103) available to beread only once by the operating system and any other authorized program,including programs like: a driver or drivers and others that interfacebetween the operating system and thedevice-with-encryption-decryption-key (100). Preferably, this willprevent any subsequent read performed by the operating system (120) ofthe computer (130), and a ready by a combination of the operating system(120), driver(s), central processing unit (905), or basic input/outputsystem (2130). The rules for subsequent reads of theencryption/decryption key (103), preferably apply relative to a driver'soperation, to authorized program(s) and to the operating system.

In some embodiments, a software driver (935) may gain access to thecopied encryption/decryption key (110) instead of the operating system(120), or in addition to the operating system (120). And the softwaredriver (935) may do all the encryption/decryption, passing the final endresult to the operating system (120) for saving on the secondnon-transitory computer storage medium (350) or to be executed by thecentral processing unit (905). The software driver (935) may fetch thecopied encryption/decryption key (110) from thedevice-with-encryption-decryption-key (100) latch memory (111) and beresponsible for clearing the copied encryption/decryption key (110) fromthe latch memory (111). Once the software driver (935) has read thecopied encryption/decryption key (110), as requested by the operatingsystem (120), then the software driver (935) can read the digital-DNA(300) from the second non-transitory computer storage medium (350) ofthe computer (130). The software driver (935) can then decrypt thedigital-DNA (300) and make the decrypted software program accessible tothe operating system (120) as executable code (i.e. the non-encodedsoftware (310))). Also, at installation time, the software driver (935)can use the copied encryption/decryption key (110) to encrypt softwarecode producing an encrypted code (1710), namely, the digital-DNA (300),then passing the digital-DNA (300) to the operating system (120), thenthe operating system (120) stores the encrypted code (1710) in a file inthe second non-transitory computer storage medium (350) in the computer(130).

The operation of reading the copy of encryption/decryption key (103)from the latch memory (111) of the device-with-encryption-decryption-key(100) is preferably done only once by the computer (130) at thecomputer's power up, or at the computer's reset, or a program resettingthe computer (130). After the first reading of the copiedencryption/decryption key (110), whether by a program, or by thecomputer, the ability to transfer the encryption/decryption key (103) tothe latch memory (111) for a second time is disabled. Such disablingprecludes any other program from reading the copiedencryption/decryption key (110) from thedevice-with-encryption-decryption-key (100), except at the computer'sreset, or at the computer's power up, or a program's reset. After thecopied encryption/decryption key (110) is read a first time from thelatch memory (111), then the copied encryption/decryption key (110) isdeleted from the latch memory (111). This deletion or clearing of thecopied encryption/decryption key (110) from the latch memory (111)prevents a second copying from the device-with-encryption-decryption-key(100), thus preventing a hacker's code (1550) access to the copiedencryption/decryption key (110). Such deletion and prevention may beaccomplished automatically by the device-with-encryption-decryption-key(100) or by the component accessing thedevice-with-encryption-decryption-key (100). Preferably, such deletionand prevention is accomplished right after the software driver (935)and/or operating system (120) reads it from the latch memory (111). Uponreading of the copied encryption/decryption key (110) from the latchmemory (111) by the operating system (120) or the software driver (935),the read encryption/decryption key value becomes the copiedencryption/decryption key (120-A) under the control of the operatingsystem (120) or the software driver (935), or both—once the term“operating system” is mentioned, it is to be broadly interpreted toinclude the software driver (935) as well. The term “software driver(935)” is intended to be broadly interpreted to include the operatingsystem (120) when the context so permits.

After reading the copied encryption/decryption key (110) from thedevice-with-encryption-decryption-key (100), the process of encryptingand decrypting is preferably performed without any user intervention andwithout requiring a user to supply user's credentials like user'sidentification and password before the encryption/decryption initiation.

The operating system (120) preferably uses the copiedencryption/decryption key (120-A) to encrypt a non-encoded software(310) so as to produce an encrypted program, namely the digital-DNA(300). The operating system (120) then stores the digital-DNA (300) inthe second non-transitory computer storage medium (350) of the computer.The operating system (120) then uses the copied encryption/decryptionkey (120-A) to decrypt the digital-DNA (300) to produce a non-encodedsoftware (310). Then the central processing unit (905) fetches thenon-encoded software (310) from the random access memory (925) of thecomputer and uses it.

In another embodiment, the operating system (120) fetches thedigital-DNA (300) from the computer (130) second non-transitory computerstorage medium (350) and stores it in the computer (130) random accessmemory (925). And once the central processing unit (905) requests a byteof the Digital-DNA (300) from the random access memory (925) of thecomputer, the requested byte is decrypted and returned to the centralprocessing unit (905) for use.

In an embodiment, once a user buys adevice-with-encryption-decryption-key (100) that is detachable and itcontains the encryption/decryption key (103). Then the user attaches thedevice-with-encryption-decryption-key (100) to the computer (130)operated by the user, and from the computer (130), the user registersthe device-with-encryption-decryption-key (100) with the server computer(1000) of the manufacturer. At the registration time, the databaserecord (1000A) of the server computer (1000) of the manufacturer alreadycontains the optional software driver (1001); the serial-number (1002)of the device-with-encryption-decryption-key (100); thedevice-with-encryption-decryption-key-ID (1003) of thedevice-with-encryption-decryption-key (100), and theencryption/decryption key (103) which is a copy of theencryption/decryption key (103) of thedevice-with-encryption-decryption-key (100).

The user then provides to the operating system (120) of the computer(130) the user's identification, the user's password and thedevice-with-encryption-decryption-key-ID of thedevice-with-encryption-decryption-key (100).

Next: the operating system (120) sends through the first secure link(1010), the user provided information to the server computer (1000).Once the server computer (1000) matches the receiveddevice-with-encryption-decryption-key-ID of thedevice-with-encryption-decryption-key (100) with thedevice-with-encryption-decryption-key-ID (1003) stored in the servercomputer (1000) database record (1000A), the server computer (1000) addsto the already existing record, the received user's ID (1005) and theuser's password (1006) to the server computer (1000) database record(1000A), completing the registration.

After registration, the server computer (1000) through the first securelink (1010), returns to the operating system (120)device-with-encryption-decryption-key-ID the optional software driver(1001) to be downloaded by the computer (130) which thedevice-with-encryption-decryption-key (100) is connected to, and theserial-number (1002).

The operating system (120) then fetches a copied encryption/decryptionkey (110) from the device-with-encryption-decryption-key (100) latchmemory (111) and encrypts the optional software driver (1001) derivingan encrypted software driver (1065), the operating system (120) usingthe copy of the encryption/decryption key also encrypts theserial-number (1002) of the device, that was received, deriving theencrypted serial number (1045). Then the encrypted serial number (1045)is associated with the user provideddevice-with-encryption-decryption-key-ID (referred ascopy-of-device-with-encryption-decryption-key-ID (1003A)) in a file(1040), then saved in second non-transitory computer storage medium(350) of the computer (130) to which thedevice-with-encryption-decryption-key (100) is connect to. It ispossible that the encrypted serial number (1045) andcopy-of-device-with-encryption-decryption-key-ID (1003A) be saved in twofiles, instead of one.

If it happens that the user loses the originaldevice-with-encryption-decryption-key (100) containing theencryption/decryption key (103), then the user can buy the new DEDK(1250) with the new DEDK non-transitory computer storage medium (1260).Then the new DEDK (1250) is placed (thirty-third arrow line (1200A))into a cradle (1235) which may be attached (thirty-fourth arrow line(1200B)) to any universal serial bus port of the computer or any otherport for attaching a peripheral to the computer (130).

Then, after the new DEDK (1250) is plugged into the cradle (1235) andthe cradle connected to the computer (130), the user at the computer(130) initiates a connection through the second secure link (1200) withthe server computer (1000) of the manufacturer processing the databaserecord (1000A) and logs in with the server computer (1000) providing tothe server computer (1000) the user's ID (1005), the user's password(1006), and the device-with-encryption-decryption-key-ID (1003).

Then, after the server computer (1000) of the manufacturer matches theuser provided login data, the server computer (1000) retrieves from thedatabase record (1000A) the serial-number (1002) of the originaldevice-with-encryption-decryption-key (100) and theencryption/decryption key (103) of the originaldevice-with-encryption-decryption-key (100). Next, the server computer(1000) returns them through the second secure link (1200) to theoperating system (120) of the computer (130). Next, the operating system(120) then matches the user's provideddevice-with-encryption-decryption-key-ID (1003) with thecopy-of-the-device-with-encryption-decryption-key-ID (1003A) from thefile (1040), if a match is produced, then the operating system (120)uses the received encryption/decryption key (103) and decrypts theencrypted serial number (1045) stored the file (1040).

If the decrypted serial number matches the received serial-number (1002)from the server computer (1000) of the manufacturer, then a programrunning on the computer (130) or on the cradle (1235) sends a commandsignal to the blank device-without-encryption-decryption-key, so as totransfer from the cradle (1235) the encryption/decryption key (103)received from the server computer (1000) of the manufacturer to be savedin the new DEDK non-transitory computer storage medium (1260) of the newDEDK (1250).

Circuitry for the Device-with-Encryption-Decryption-Key

FIG. 1A is related to FIG. 2A, FIG. 2B, FIG. 10 and FIG. 11. FIG. 1Aillustrates an example of components of thedevice-with-encryption-decryption-key (100). Thedevice-with-encryption-decryption-key (100) stores theencryption/decryption key (103). The storage means is preferably one ofa non-transitory computer storage medium, a read only memory, a flashmemory, and an electrical programmable read only memory.

The device-with-encryption-decryption-key (100) preferably includes agate control circuitry (105), which controls signal flow between thefirst-non-transitory computer storage medium (104) and the latch memory(111). The first-non-transitory computer storage medium (104) of thedevice-with-encryption-decryption-key (100) preferably hasnon-transitory memory cells ((103A), (103B), (103C), and (103C)). Thenon-transitory memory cells hold values of the encryption/decryption key(103). The latch memory (111) preferably includes non-transitory latchmemory cells (110A), (110B), (110C), and (110D) holding individualcopies of bytes of the encryption/decryption key (103).

Preferably, the gate control circuitry (105) includes a timer/trigger(105A). The timer/trigger (105A) is an electronic circuitry used to firea signal once something happens, in this particular case, a certainamount of time after the computer is turned on or reset—for instance, afew milliseconds, or a few seconds, or longer.

When the timer/trigger (105A) is present, the gate control circuitry(105) further includes an electronic tristate switch (105B) whichoperates like a wall switch to light bulb. When the wall switch isclosed, electricity flows through the wires lighting the light bulb.When open, the wall switch stops the flow of electricity and turns offthe light bulb. Thus, when closed, the electronic tristate switch (105B)permits the flow of an electronic signal. When open, the electronictristate switch (105B) disables the flow of the electronic signal.

The timer/trigger (105A) is an example, but there are many other ways ofdesigning the device-with-encryption-decryption-key (100) to achieve thesame end result as in the explanation herein. Therefore, the explanationgiven is not intended to be limited as the only way, it is but one wayfor the device to be operating with thedevice-with-encryption-decryption-key (100).

After the computer is turned on or reset, the output line of thetimer/trigger (105A), which is connected to the electronic tristateswitch (105B), will be high, that is, having a value of “1”. And with ahigh state signal, the electronic tristate switch (105B) automaticallycloses (FIG. 2A gate control circuitry (105)). In a closed state, thevalues of the bytes of each of the non-transitory memory cells (103A),(103B), (103C), and (103D) holding the encryption/decryption key (103)will be transferred to the non-transitory latch memory cells (110A),(110B), (110C), and (110D) of the latch memory (111). Key_1 (103A) willbe transferred to the memory location Key_a (110A). Key_2 (103B) will betransferred to the memory location Key_b (110B). Key_3 (103C) will betransferred to the memory location Key_b (110C). And, Key_n (103D) willbe transferred to the memory location Key_z (110D).

After a specified time-threshold has elapsed, the timer/trigger (105A)changes from high “1” (positive) to low “0”. Once this happens, theoutput of the electronic tristate switch (105B) turns intohigh-impedance, which means that thedevice-with-encryption-decryption-key (100) is disconnected from therest of the circuitry of the computer (130) as illustrated at FIG. 2Bgate control circuitry (105).

The signal value from encryption/decryption key (103) will only gothrough the electronic tristate switch (105B) at the high state(positive) of the timer/trigger (105A), before the timer/trigger (105A)activates by turning from positive state “1” to low “0”. After itactivates, the electronic tristate switch (105B) shuts off and no signalgoes through it again, except if the computer ((130) FIG. 2A) goesthrough a power-down and power-up, or reset.

Only one gate control circuitry (105) is illustrated between Key_1(103A) and Key_a (110A), but preferably, each key (103B), (103C), and(103D) will have one, linking each to its cell in the latch memory (111)holding a copy of the encryption/decryption key (103). Preferably, thereis one gate between (103B) and (110B), one gate between (103C) and(110C), and one gate between (103D) and (110D).

For the purpose of simplicity and for the sake of clear and conciseexplanation of the invention, just the encryption/decryption key (103)will be stated. But it is to be understood that it involves a copy ofthe encryption/decryption key (103) and also the memory holding thecopy, both are subsumed herein as the encryption/decryption key (103).

In the device-with-encryption-decryption-key (100), a tristate bank(136) may also be present for the computer's protection in case thebasic input/output system (2130) stored in read only memory, namely theROM BIOS shown in FIG. 9, needs to access thedevice-with-encryption-decryption-key (100) and inhibit a program fromreading of the stored encryption/decryption key (103). If this becomesnecessary, the ROM BIOS issues a signal to the timer/trigger (132). Oncethe timer/trigger (132) activates with a low signal “0”, the tristatebank (136) is set to high-impedance state, thus disabling the signalflow (134) leaving the latch memory (111) from reaching the output(138). And the output of the stored encryption/decryption key (103) willnot be read by any program in the computer (130). The timer/trigger(132) may also be designed to activate or fire after a lapse of time. Ifdone this way, then the ROM BIOS may not be needed because thetimer/trigger (132) can be designed to fire within a short time whichwill not enable programs, from a plugged device, enough time to read theoutput (138) from the device-with-encryption-decryption-key (100) viathe tristate bank (136).

This may happen when a bootable compact disk or any bootable device isplugged to the computer (130). Such action would enable the basicinput/output system (2130), also referred to as the ROM BIOS, to readthe operating system from the external device, instead of from theoperating system (120) that is the actual authorized operating system onthe computer (130). Were this to happen, then a program executed throughan external operating system would be able to easily read the storedencryption/decryption key (103) and send it to hackers, who would thenbe able to write a virus and encrypt it using the stolenencryption/decryption key (103), producing the computer's digital-DNA,then injecting and storing virus on the computer (130). Should thathappen, the operating system (120) of the computer (130) would not beable to distinguish the virus from validly encrypted programs, thusdefeating the security implemented using thedevice-with-encryption-decryption-key (100).

Alternatively, the timer/trigger (132) may not be needed, if the basicinput/output system (2130) connects directly (first dashed line (131))to the tristate bank (136) or through another kind of electronicgate/circuitry, so as to enable the same functionality as is done withthe use of the timer/trigger (132).

The circuitry for the device-with-encryption-decryption-key (100) may bemuch more complex than discussed above. The discussion above ispresented for simplicity and not in any way trying to obscure theinvention. This circuitry may be designed differently, such as forexample, when gate control circuitry (105) is not present, then themeans for gate mechanism for turning off thedevice-with-encryption-decryption-key (100) may be integrated elsewhere.No matter the location, some kind of gate, similar logic, or action ispreferably present. If no gate or similar action is present, then theuser could simply remove or disable thedevice-with-encryption-decryption-key (100) from the computer (130),such as for example, when it is installed via a computer port, such as auniversal serial bus port. If the device-with-encryption-decryption-key(100) is part of a compact disk in a compact disk reader, then thecompact disk could be ejected from the reader.

Cradle's Circuitry Operable to Save an Encryption/Decryption Key

Assuming that the device-with-encryption-decryption-key (100) is anexternal device plugged into a universal serial bus port and the userloses the device-with-encryption-decryption-key (100), then there wouldbe a problem: The central processing unit (905) of the computer (130)would not be able to execute its digital-DNA because each computer has aunique digital-DNA.

The solution to a lost device-with-encryption-decryption-key (100) is toenable preparation of a replacement device, i.e., a new device, whichwhen programmed, the encryption/decryption key (103) is then referred toas a new DEDK (1250). To permit preparation of the new DEDK (1250),programming would be needed to enable storage of theencryption/decryption key (103) in its original state in the replacementdevice. But here too, another problem arises that creates a securityvulnerability in the device-with-encryption-decryption-key (100). If thereplacement device could be accessed directly and programmed with aduplicate original of the encryption/decryption key (103), then anyprogram could access the new DEDK (1250) and read itsencryption/decryption key (103), or hack it and change theencryption/decryption key (103). The solution then is a cradle (1235),i.e. a deck, where the new DEDK (1250) could be plugged into andprogrammed with a duplicate original of encryption/decryption key (103).

FIG. 1B is related to FIG. 12, and it illustrates a new DEDK (1250)plugged into the cradle (1235). The new DEDK (1250) will hold theduplicate original encryption/decryption key. The new DEDK (1250)includes a new DEDK latch memory (1251), a gate B, i.e. the tristateswitch (106), and a new DEDK non-transitory computer storage medium(1260).

Also, when it is an external device, the cradle (1235) is a completelyindependent device, it is not part of the new DEDK (1250). The cradle(1235) may be a universal serial bus device plugged into a universalserial bus port. The cradle (1235) may be a computer board/blade in thecomputer, or a device attached to the computer in any form. The cradle(1235) has the cradle latch memory (1236) to hold a copy of theencryption/decryption key (103) to be saved in the new DEDK (1250).

The cradle latch memory (1236) has random access memory cells (1236A),(1236B), (1236C), and (1236D), shown in FIG. 1B. A program (theoperating system (120) or the software driver (935)) running on thecomputer (130) transfers the encryption/decryption key (103) from thecomputer (130) to the cradle (1235) and the cradle (1235) stores theencryption/decryption key (103) into the random access memory cells((1236A), (1236B), (1236C), and (1236D)) of the cradle latch memory(1236).

The new DEDK (1250) has the new DEDK latch memory (1251) and the newDEDK latch memory (1251) has latch memory cells (1251A), (1251B),(1251C), and (1251D), shown in FIG. 1B. The new DEDK (1250) also has thenew DEDK non-transitory computer storage medium (1260), which has thenon-transitory memory cells (1260A), (1260B), (1260C), and (1260D),shown in FIG. 1B.

Once a replacement device, i.e. the new DEDK (1250), is inserted intothe cradle (1235) (thirty-third arrow line (1200A)) and the process forsaving a duplicate original of the encryption/decryption key (103) isinitiated, the cradle (1235) stores the duplicate original in the cradlelatch memory (1236) of the cradle (1235). The duplicate original of theencryption/decryption key (103) is automatically transferred from thecradle (1235) via the fourth secure link (1245) to the replacementdevice, which then becomes the new DEDK (1250), with thedevice-with-encryption-decryption-key (100). Next, the cradle (1235)sends a high signal via fifth secure link (1240) to the tristate switch(106), which activates the tristate switch (106), transferring via thesixth secure link (1255) the encryption/decryption key's bytes of theencryption/decryption key (103) from the new DEDK latch memory (1251) toa flash memory group, namely the new DEDK non-transitory computerstorage medium (1260). And finally, the cradle (1235) sends a signal viaseventh secure link (1240A) to the new DEDK non-transitory computerstorage medium (1260) writing the encryption/decryption key (103) thatis new.

Preferably, tristate (106), is subdivided into one tristate switch foreach byte in the new DEDK non-transitory computer storage medium (1260)of the new DEDK (1250) storing the encryption/decryption key (103), asshown in FIG. 1B. There will be one tristate switch between Key_b(1251B) and Key_2 (1260B). One tristate switch between Key_c (1251C) andKey_3 (1260C). And, one tristate switch between Key_z (1251D) and Key_n(1260D). Also, tristate switch B (106) may be integral part of the newDEDK non-transitory computer storage medium (1260).

Saving Sentive Information on the Device-with-Encryption-Decryption-Key

FIG. 1A and FIG. 1B illustrate the device-with-encryption-decryption-key(100) able to save and retrieve a value (e.g. the encryption/decryptionkey (103)) but can also be used for other purposes as well. An exampleis, instead of having values stored in the operating system's registry,the most sensitive values may be stored into thedevice-with-encryption-decryption-key (100). For instance, the operatingsystem might be authorized to save a checksum (a result from acomputation of each byte's value in a file) of a file to certify thatthe file hasn't been changed by a virus.

Computer Circutry

FIG. 9 illustrates preferred hardware for the computer (130), whichincludes a central processing unit (905) responsible for operation ofthe computer (130). Once the computer (130) is powered up or reset, thecentral processing unit (905) initiates program code stored in the basicinput/output system (2130), shown in FIG. 9 and FIGS. 20-22. The ROMBIOS, i.e. the basic input/output system, has the software code thatonce executed, instructs the central processing unit (905) to load theoperating system (120) from a second non-transitory computer storagemedium (350) shown in FIGS. 3-4, FIG. 9, and FIGS. 21-22, into therandom access memory (925).

After the operating system (120) is loaded into random access memory(925), the instruction code of the basic input/output system (2130)transfers control to the first byte of the operating system (120), andthe operating system (120) takes over the operation of the computer(130). The operating system (120) then accesses the secondnon-transitory computer storage medium (350), and loads the softwaredriver (935) into the random access memory (925). The software driver(935) works in conjunction with the operating system (120). At themoment that the computer (130) powers up or resets, thedevice-with-encryption-decryption-key (100), which, preferably is aseparate unit attached (see the first arrow line (100A)) to the computer(130), initiates the transfer of its encryption/decryption key (103) tothe latch memory (111) through the tristate switch, i.e. the gatecontrol circuitry (105), if present. Thereafter, either, the operatingsystem (120) or the software driver (935), or both, reads (see firstdouble-headed arrow line (121) and second double-headed arrow line(956)) the copy of the encryption/decryption key (110). After the copyof the encryption/decryption key (103) is read, the tristate switch,which is the gate control circuitry (105), gets turned off, if it isn'talready. After reading the copy of the encryption/decryption key (110),the operating system (120) clears the copy of the encryption/decryptionkey (110) from the latch memory (111).

To prevent code injection into the random access memory (925), therandom access memory auxiliary (952), which is optional, works inconjunction (third double-headed arrow line (954)) with thedevice-with-encryption-decryption-key (100), to use the copy ofencryption/decryption key (110) stored in the latch memory (111) of thedevice-with-encryption-decryption-key (100) to encrypt/decrypt softwareloaded in the random access memory (925) of the computer (130). Theinvention can be implemented where the random access memory auxiliary(952), if present, through (second arrow line (955)) and/or the centralprocessing unit (905) through (thirty-second arrow line (906)) connectedto the device-with-encryption-decryption-key (100) access theencryption/decryption key (103) directly from the first-non-transitorycomputer storage medium (104) of thedevice-with-encryption-decryption-key (100). If implemented this way thedevice-with-encryption-decryption-key (100) will not have the tristateswitch, i.e., the gate control circuitry (105), and also will not havethe latch memory (111).

As the computer (130) proceeds with its operations, it may fromtime-to-time, request and or receive outside data through, for example,I/O port (915). Such outside data might be data from a wirelessconnection. The hardware described herein do not describe a completecomputer package of hardware. The basics disclosed are not intended toobscure the invention, since it is well known to those skilled in theart that many other of the usual components are not discussed like:mouse, keyboard, screen, etc.

Also, the arrangement shown in FIG. 9 may be a computer board installedinside another computer capable of all the specified functionalities,like: encryption and decryption, instead of the operating system (120).If the arrangement is implemented as computer board, then thedevice-with-encryption-decryption-key (100) may be integral part of thecomputer board.

Device for Stopping Virus Infection in a Computer

FIG. 2A supplements FIG. 1A, and it illustrates a preferred embodimentof the present invention. FIG. 2A depicts adevice-with-encryption-decryption-key (100) connected (first arrow line(100A)) to the computer (130). The device-with-encryption-decryption-key(100) has the first-non-transitory computer storage medium (104) holdinga permanent copy of the encryption/decryption key (103) and latch memory(111) that holds a copy of the encryption/decryption key (103). Thelatch memory (111) may be integral part of thedevice-with-encryption-decryption-key (100) or it may be somewhereelse—not part of the device-with-encryption-decryption-key (100).

The device-with-encryption-decryption-key (100) may be an electronicdevice (microchip), a compact disk in a compact disk reader, a universalserial bus device, a pluggable computer card/blade, a mobile device, orany device which will allow the encryption/decryption key (103) to betransferred to the latch memory (111), and from latch memory (111) tothe random access memory (925) of the computer (130) and used at thecomputer (130) for the purpose of producing the digital-DNA of thecomputer (130). The term microchip is to be interpreted broadly toinclude the device-with-encryption-decryption-key (100) implementedinside a central processing unit (905), part of the basic input/outputsystem (2130) or stored, or programmed in an electronic microchip, or bepart of the random access memory auxiliary (952).

The device-with-encryption-decryption-key (100) preferably includescomputer readable memory, i.e. a physical component that stores theencryption/decryption key (103), and it may be a read only memory whichis written only once, or it may the flash memory which can be writtenmultiple times, or any kind of non-transitory computer storage medium.

The gate control circuitry (105) is optional since other means can beused to provide the same functionality, like a flag which may be set bythe operating system (120), or by thedevice-with-encryption-decryption-key (100) to indicate that theencryption/decryption key (103) has been provided.

At power up of the computer (130), thedevice-with-encryption-decryption-key (100) activates, and if the gatecontrol circuitry (105), while optional, is in use, it will enabletransfer of the encryption/decryption key (103) of thedevice-with-encryption-decryption-key (100) from thefirst-non-transitory computer storage medium (104) to the latch memory(111). Next, the ROM BIOS, is activated and it in turn loads theoperating system (120) into random access memory (925). Once theoperating system (120) becomes operational, it will read theencryption/decryption key (103) which is stored in the latch memory(111) of the device-with-encryption-decryption-key (100). The operatingsystem (120) then stores (first double-headed arrow line (121)) theencryption/decryption key (103) in the random access memory (925) of thecomputer (130). Thereafter, the operating system (120) proceeds andclears from the latch memory (111) the copy of encryption/decryption key(103), as illustrated at FIG. 2B.

The device-with-encryption-decryption-key (100) may be configured topreclude a second transfer of the encryption/decryption key (103). Oncethe device-with-encryption-decryption-key (100) transfers theencryption/decryption key (103) to the latch memory (111) of thedevice-with-encryption-decryption-key (100) through gate controlcircuitry (105), then the device-with-encryption-decryption-key (100)raises a flag or turns off the gate control circuitry (105) as toindicate that the encryption/decryption key (103) has been transferredfor a first time, therefore preventing a second transfer. For instance,at the computer (130) power up, a register of thedevice-with-encryption-decryption-key (100) may have a flag-value of “0”to indicate that the encryption/decryption key (103) has not beentransferred yet. Then, after the encryption/decryption key (103) hasbeen transferred to the latch memory (111), it will set the flag-valuein the register to “1”. Thereafter, any subsequent requests will beignored because the flag-value is set to “1”. And, if flag schema isused, the gate control circuitry (105) would not be needed.

The hardware may be controlled by a step wherein theencryption/decryption key (103) is read from thedevice-with-encryption-decryption-key (100) by the operating system(120) or any authorized program, only once. Alternatively, it may becontrolled by a step wherein the encryption/decryption key (103) is readmultiple times as long as in reading it more than once, this will notcause the security of the computer (130) to be compromised.

The device-with-encryption-decryption-key (100) may be a smart cellphone with software that communicates with the computer through itswireless (Wi-Fi) or Bluetooth connection. This method is more fullyexplained in the disclosure relating to FIG. 14.

FIG. 2B illustrates a further overview of FIG. 2A. After theencryption/decryption key (103) is transferred to the latch memory (111)of the device-with-encryption-decryption-key (100), the gate controlcircuitry (105) is opened, illustrated as lacking the arrow in thecircle (the gate control circuitry (105)). After the operating system(120) or the software driver (935) or both (from now one referred as theoperating system (120)), reads the copy of the encryption/decryption key(103) from the latch memory (111), then the operating system (120)proceeds and clears the latch memory (111) so as not be available to theoperating system (120) for a second time. When so cleared, this denotesthat the operating system (120) no longer has any connection with thedevice-with-encryption-decryption-key (100)—the first double-headedarrow line (121) is missing, the gate control circuitry (105) is openand the latch memory (111) is lacking the value “0123456789”. Theoperating system (120) has available the copied encryption/decryptionkey (120-A). And as illustrated, thedevice-with-encryption-decryption-key (100) is still connected/plugged(FIG. 2B first arrow line (100A)) into the computer (130), but for alleffects, it is technically disconnected from the electronic circuitry ofthe computer (130).

FIG. 3, which is a further embodiment of FIG. 2A and FIG. 2B, depictsthe process of installing a software program (330) on the computer(130). The software program is a software program without any encoding(also called the non-encoded software (310))), the same kind of softwarewhich is commonly used in today's prior art, and which can be installedin any computer running the operating system for which the program wasdesigned. Examples include an accounting software or word processor, ora spreadsheet software, website code file, JavaScript code file, adriver, batch code file, script code file, etc.

Proceeding with FIG. 3. It depicts the invention being used in theprocess of installing a non-encoded software (310) on the computer(130). Reminding again, the non-encoded software (310) is a regularsoftware without any encoding, it is the exactly the same software ofthe prior art which is currently available and that can run (beexecuted) in any computer having the Operating System for which thenon-encoded software (310) was programmed to be executed thereon.

The storage medium holding software (340) may be in the form of compactdisk or downloaded (indicated by the seventh arrow line (341)) from anonline trusted source. The storage medium holding software (340) holdsthe non-encoded software (310)) which will be executed by centralprocessing unit (905) in the computer (130). Also taking part in theinstallation process of the non-encoded software (310) is anoptional-header-identification-code (320). The operating system (120)generates the optional-header-identification-code (320). Theoptional-header-identification-code (320) may have any string's valuee.g. “VALIDATED DNA” or any kind of value inserted by the operatingsystem (120), and which the operating system (120) will use later toidentify if the software has been tampered with after it was convertedinto its digital-DNA format. If mentioned that operating system (120) isexecuting the software code, but it is to be broadly interpreted thatthe central processing unit (905) is the one doing the execution of thesoftware code and the operating system (120) is doing the managing ofthe hardware and software and working in conjunction with the centralprocessing unit (905).

FIG. 3 illustrates receiving the non-encoded software (310) through anetwork connection (indicated by the seventh arrow line (341)). Then thesoftware program (330) becomes the non-encoded software (310) which ismade available through a computer connection (sixth arrow line (321)) tothe operating system (120). The operating system (120) may add theoptional-header-identification-code (320) to the non-encoded software(310) forming a software program (330) before its conversion to thecomputer (130) digital-DNA using the copied encryption/decryption key(120-A) which is under the control of the operating system (120).

Then the operating system (120) uses the copied encryption/decryptionkey (120-A) and encrypts the software program (330), producing (thirdarrow line (301)) the first-encrypted software program, the Digital-DNA(300) which is unique to computer (130). Then the operating system (120)sends (fourth arrow line (301A)) the digital-DNA (300) to the computer(130) and the computer (130) saves (fifth arrow line (301B)) thedigital-DNA (300) in the second non-transitory computer storage medium(350), shown in FIG. 3.

The digital-DNA (300) is now encoded/encrypted and cannot be executed asis without first being decrypted, since the central processing unit(905) of the computer (130) can only execute/use the non-encodedsoftware (310)). But the digital-DNA (300) is encoded, and if thecentral processing unit (905) tries to execute it as is, the digital-DNA(300) will not be in a format which is understood by the centralprocessing unit (905).

The optional-header-identification-code (320) may be separated from thenon-encoded software (310). Both may reside in two distinct files withthe same name and a distinct file extension. Or, both may be in a singlefile. Either way, both would be encrypted with the encryption/decryptionkey (103).

FIG. 4 illustrates the opposite process of FIG. 3, which involves thedecryption of the digital-DNA (300). FIG. 4 illustrates converting thedigital-DNA (300) back to the non-encoded software (310). Once theexecution of the digital-DNA (300) is requested by a user, or by theoperating system (120), or by another program in the computer (130), theoperating system (120) communicates with the computer (130) and requestfrom computer (130) the digital-DNA (300) stored in the secondnon-transitory computer storage medium (350). Next, the computer (130)accesses the second non-transitory computer storage medium (350) viaconnection (eighth arrow line (403A)) and makes available (via link A(ninth arrow line (403B)) and link B (tenth arrow line (403))) thedigital-DNA (300) to the requesting operating system (120).

The operating system (120) uses the copied encryption/decryption key(120-A) and decrypts the digital-DNA (300) producing the non-encodedsoftware (310) and the optional-header-identification-code (320), whichis the software program (330) as originally encrypted. Next, theoperating system (120) verifies (eleventh arrow line (411)) theoptional-header-identification-code (320), and if contains the phrase“VALIDATED DNA”, then the operating system (120) knows that thedigital-DNA (300) has not been tampered with. Finally, the operatingsystem (120) loads (twelfth arrow line (431)) the non-encoded software(310)) in the random access memory (925) of the computer (130) passingthe starting location of the non-encoded software (310)) to the centralprocessing unit (905) and the central processing unit (905) executes thenon-encoded software (310) fetching instructions of the non-encodedsoftware (310) from random access memory (925), as needed.

The optional-header-identification-code (320) may also include avalidation code, such as the number of bytes (length) of the non-encodedsoftware (310) or any other means to validate the file, like a checksum(A checksum is a small-sized datum derived from a block of digital datafor the purpose of detecting errors which may have been introducedduring its transmission or storage) of the non-encoded software (310)content before its encryption. If a validation code is included, thenthe operating system (120) performs a check sum of the non-encodedsoftware (310) and check with the checksum of theoptional-header-identification-code (320) to verify if the file is stillthe software program (330) as originally encrypted. Theoptional-header-identification-code (320) may also include otherinformation like the maker of the software, the software serial number,the software version, etc.

Explaining a basic encryption process to derive the digital-DNA (300).Assuming that the schema for encrypting is a multiplication of theencryption key value by the value to be encrypted, and the decryption isthe division of the value to be decrypted by the encryption key value.If it is assumed that the non-encoded software (310) is the code value“9” that can be executed by the central processing unit (905). But oncethe non-encoded software (310) is encrypted with theencryption/decryption key (103), and assuming that the value of theencryption/decryption key (103) is “7”. Then, after this value of “7” ismultiplied by the non-encoded software (310) which is the value of “9”,then the end-result will become “63” (the digital-DNA (300)). Once thecentral processing unit (905) reads the digital-DNA (300) (the value of(“63”)) it will not understand it because it has been encrypted, andtherefore, it will not be able to process and execute it.

However, since the operating system (120) has the copiedencryption/decryption key (120-A) with the value of “7”, all of what theoperating system (120) will have do is use the value of “7” do performthe decryption, which is just the opposite of the encryption, and sincethe encryption involved the multiplication of “7” with “9” to obtain thevalue “63”, the operating system (120) or the central processing unit(905) will take the value “63” and divide it by the value of “7” (theencryption/decryption key (103)) and retrieves the actual value of “9”(the non-encoded software). Once the value of “9” is obtained, which thecentral processing unit understands, the value of “9” is loaded it intothe random access memory (925) and the central process unit (905)executes it.

When a request to run software is made on computer (130) where thedigital-DNA software is installed, the operating system (120) firstunencrypts the digital-DNA software, then the central processing unitexecutes it.

A computer infection with a virus typically occurs without user'sknowledge and without any indication to the operating system. However,the virus present in the computer would be un-encoded and if a requestto execute the un-encoded virus is performed on the computer (130), twothings will happen: 1) since the operating system (120) decrypts adigital-DNA code before its execution, and, 2) since a decryption is theopposite of an encryption. Therefore, once a request for execution ofthe un-encoded virus code is initiated, the operating system (120) orthe central processing unit (905) will first decrypt it before itsexecution, but once the un-encoded code is decrypted, it will becomeencoded, that is, it will become encrypted and transformed into thecomputer (130) digital-DNA then stored into the computer (130) randomaccess memory (925) prior to its execution. But the central processingunit (905) only executes non-encoded software program code, once thecentral processing unit (905) tries to execute the virus-digital-DNA,the central processing unit (905) will not understand it, halting theoperation of the virus-digital-DNA. Once the term the operating system(120) is mentioned doing the encryption/decryption, it is to be broadlyinterpreted to include the central processing unit (905) as well. Also,once the term the central processing unit (905) is mentioned doing theencryption/decryption, it is to be broadly interpreted to include theoperating system (120) as well.

Virus Invalidation Example

Assuming the un-encoded virus installed on the computer (130) has avalue of “70”, also, as explained before, assuming that the encryptioninvolves a multiplication of the value to encrypt and theencryption/decryption key value and the decryption involves the divisionof the encrypted value by the encryption/decryption key value. Once theoperating system (120) is commanded to initiate the execution of anun-encoded virus, since the central processing unit (905)—FIG. 9, willonly execute instructions which has been decrypted, then the operatingsystem (120) decrypts the un-encoded virus using the copiedencryption/decryption key (120-A), which in this example has a value of“7”. The operating system (120) divides the value “70” of the virus codeby “7”, which produces the value of “10” (the virus digital-DNA) thenloading the virus digital-DNA into the random access memory (925). Oncethe central processing unit (905) tries to execute the value of “10”,execution fails because then central processing unit (905) onlyunderstands un-encoded instruction values.

Encryption/Decription Conputer Logic Algorithm

The virus invalidation example above is a very basicencryption/decryption algorithm. A preferable computer algorithm woulduse a more sophisticated mathematical formula with very large values inthe hundreds of numbers in length, or computer logic with very largeencryption key. Preferably, encryption would produce a value using thecomputer logic XOR (eXclusive OR).

Computers only understand electronic signals and they are represented inthe form of low-signal which is a zero “0” and high-signal which is aone “1”. Therefore, anything which an English speaking human readilyunderstands is meaningless to a computer. For instance, before theletter “a” can be understood by a computer, two steps need to be appliedto it: first, be converted into a numeric table which represents theletter “a”; then the numeric value is converted into a value representedby zeros and ones, which is a value the computer understands. The “a” isfirst converted into its numerical value of “97”. Then, in the followingstep, the value of “97” is converted into the binary value of“01100001”, which the computer understands.

The binary value of “01100001” (each “0” or “1” is called bit)represents the value of “97”. The very first value starting from theright represents the value of “1” and each subsequent value going to theleft of the byte, represents the prior value times “2” (binary valuerepresentation, since computers only understands “0” and “1” (binary)).Finally, all the values which is under the binary value representationwith a value of “1”, is added together. Let's see how it works.

128 64 32 16 8 4 2 1 binary value representation 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 thebyte value for the letter “a” 0 64 32 0 0 0 0 1 the resulting conversionvalues 64 + 32 + 1 = 97 - once converted back it represents the letter“a”

Since, if a binary value of “0” doesn't get added in the finalconversion, then if a number is of low value it may be represented justby the first half of the byte value (the four rightmost bits), and thisis what is shown in the next example: The use of only half of a byte forsimplicity.

FIG. 5 illustrates two half-byte values being XOR-ed by the computer'selectronic circuitry. The second row from top (510), far right value of“9” is XOR-ed with the third row from top (520), far right value of “7”.The XOR operation uses the binary representation of the values that itwill process, that is, XOR. In an XOR operation once two binary valuesare XORed, bit-by-bit, if two bits are the same, that is, if both bitsare “0” or both bits are “1” then the resulting value is “1”, on theother hand, if any of the two values are different, that is, if one is“0” and the other is “1”, then the resulting value is “0”.

For instance, the value of “9”, shown at in the second row from top(510) at the right end, is represented by the byte value of “00001001”and the value of “7” is “00000111”. For these examples, the fourleftmost bit values are ignored since our examples uses small values,we're using half-byte value. XOR is the most used method inencryption/decryption since the resultant value has the same length ofthe two values being XOR-ed and computers easily complete XOR operationsbecause it involves comparisons, something computers are very fast at.

Once two values are XOR-ed and the XOR result is applied to either ofthe original values in a second XOR operation, the operation result willproduce the missing value—the value not taking part of the XORoperation.

Top row (500) of FIG. 5 illustrates the reference value for each bitunder it. For instance, the value is “9”, shown at in the second rowfrom top (510) at the right end, has four bits. And, if we analyze thetop row (500) and the second row from top (510) has a bit value of “1”under “1” and “1” under “8”, and it represents the value of “9” (8+1=9).The value of “9” (510) represents the program page (FIG. 3 non-encodedsoftware (310)) and the next value is “7” in the third row from top(520) is derived from the sum (4+2+1=7), which represents theencryption/decryption key (103)). Once the value of “9” is XORed withthe value of “7”, the result is “14” in the fourth row from top (530).The value of “14” is derived from the sum (8+4+2=14). The value of “14”is the digital-DNA (300)). This process illustrates how a computerencrypts two values using its electronic logic.

FIG. 6 has the first row (600), which is the same as the top row (500)of FIG. 5. The result “14” at the far right in the second row (610)represents the digital-DNA (300). The result “14” is XORed with thevalue of “7” at the far right in the third row (620), which is theencryption/decryption key (103). The result of XORing the value “14”with the value “7” derives the value of ‘9’ in the fourth row (630),which represents the non-encoded software (310), in a format which thecentral processing unit (905) understands.

If a computer virus has a value of “70”, it would be converted to abinary format, as follows:

128 64 32 16 8 4 2 1 binary value representation 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 thevirus binary representing the value of “70” 0 64 0 0 0 4 2 0 theresulting conversion values 64 + 4 + 2 = 70 - virus code

If the virus “01000110” is present in the computer (130), it may only beexecuted if the operating system (120) or the central processing unit(905) first decrypts the virus with the value of encryption/decryptionkey (103), which is “7”, binary “00000111”. This operation is—

128 64 32 16 8 4 2 1 binary value representation 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 thevirus binary representing the value of “70” 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 theencryption/decryption key (103) representing the value of “7” 1 0 1 1 11 1 0 the XOR of resulting conversion values between “70” and “7” 128 032 16 8 4 2 0 Resulting decimal value of the XOR operation 128 + 32 +16 + 8 + 4 + 2 = 190 - virus digital-DNA

Once the virus is converted to the digital-DNA value of “190”, thecentral processing unit (905) will not be able to execute it because thecentral processing unit (905) only understands the virus original valueof “70”, not its digital-DNA value of “190”, therefore the virus hasbeen disabled without having caused any harm to the computer (130).Decryption is also an encryption, more like, an encryption in reverse.

Computer Virus Basics

For a computer virus to succeed and proliferate, it needs to have twoabilities: first, it needs to be able to execute itself in any computerrunning the operating system for which it was programed; and second, itneeds to be able to infect a software program, and/or replicate itselfon other computers. Once the prior art computer is running a prior artsoftware program that contains the computer virus, the prior artcomputer will also run the virus. This is because the virus is part ofthe prior art software program, i.e. the good code—this process iscalled “infection.” If the virus is able to replicate itself, then itwill wait for the appropriate time to deliver its payload, and most ofthe time, it is malicious.

If the intended good code is “9” and the virus code is “70”, thecomputer virus will insert itself into the good code “9” like“709”—usually in the beginning of the software file (the computer virus“70” is located prior to the good software code “9”). Once the operatingsystem of the prior art comes to the infected file, it proceeds toprocess the complete file containing the computer virus “70” and thegood software code “9”. It will first read “70”, loading the virus codeinto random access memory, then the central processing unit executingit, then, it will load and execute the actual good code “9”. Theoperating system and central processing unit of the prior art will notdifferentiate the computer virus “70” from the actual good computersoftware code “9” because both: the good code “9” and the bad virus code“70” are in the same kind of code-format for the operating system. Thejust described process may happen in a file, or in a process running inthe computer's random access memory.

The above examples illustrate the process using a short value torepresent a segment of good code and a short value to designate the badvirus code, but usually both programs, the good software code and thevirus code, will be many bytes long, sometimes in the thousands ormillions of bytes.

Computer Virus of the Prior Art

FIG. 7 illustrates in the operation of the prior art computer systemthat is infected with a computer virus. In FIG. 7, the computer virus(710) is positioned at the beginning of the infected computer softwarefile (700) before the good software code (720). Once the infectedcomputer software file (700) is loaded by the prior art operating systemof the prior art computer system, the central processing unit will firstexecute the computer virus (710), and as the prior art centralprocessing unit proceeds, it will execute the good software code (720).Once the infected computer software file (700) execution is requested,the operating system of the prior art would read both: the bad softwarecode, the code for the computer virus (710), and the good software code(720). Then the prior art operating system will load both into thecomputer's random access memory; then finally, the central processingunit would execute both, and each would perform the activities that eachwas programmed to perform. The good software code (720) doing itsintended good actions, and the computer virus (710) doing its intendedevil actions. This only happens because both: the executable code forthe computer virus (710) and the executable code, the good software code(720), is in the same understandable compiled code, which the priorart's central processing unit understands.

Instalation of Software Code

FIG. 8A relates to FIG. 3, and illustrates the process wherein theoperating system (120) of the computer (130) saves the digital-DNA (300)for a software program (i.e., the non-encoded software (310))) in thesecond non-transitory computer storage medium (350) of the computer(130). The device-with-encryption-decryption-key (100) holds at itsfirst-non-transitory computer storage medium an encryption/decryptionkey (103) having a value of “0123456789”. A copy of the value“0123456789” is held in the memory location (120-A) in the random accessmemory (925) of the computer (130) under the control of and used by theoperating system (120). The operating system (120) reads (fourteentharrow line (801)) the non-encoded software (310)) from the secondnon-transitory computer storage medium (350) and using the copiedencryption/decryption key (120-A) encrypts the non-encoded software(310)) producing the digital-DNA (300) (the good executable software).Then saving (thirteenth arrow line (802)) the digital-DNA (300) in thesecond-non-second non-transitory computer storage medium (350) of thecomputer (130).

Execution of Software Code of the Present Invention

FIG. 8B relates to FIG. 4, and illustrates the decryption processreversing the encryption process of FIG. 8A. In this example, at themoment that the operating system (120) loads the digital-DNA (300) forexecution (sixteenth arrow (803)). The operating system (120), using acopy of the encryption/decryption key (103) which is stored in thememory location (120-A), decrypts the digital-DNA (300) deriving theexecutable code (fifteenth arrow (804)) of the non-encoded software(310)). Then, the central processing unit (905) executes the non-encodedsoftware (310) which is stored in the random access memory (925) of thecomputer (130).

Two primary encryption/decryption steps of the process used by theoperating system (120) or the central processing unit (905) preferablyinclude: 1) at installation time, the operating system (120) encryptsthe non-encoded software (310) producing the Digital-DNA (300), thensaves it (FIG. 8A); and 2) at runtime, the operating system (120)decrypts the digital-DNA (300) producing the non-encoded software (310))that the operating system/central processing unit understands, thenexecutes it (FIG. 8B).

Stopping Computer Virus

FIG. 8C illustrates the introduction of a virus or worm (800C) into thecomputer (130). Once the operating system (120) receives a request toexecute the code of the virus or worm (800C) the operating system (120)loads (eighteenth arrow line (805)) the executable code of the virus orworm (800C) and then proceed to decrypt it (seventeenth arrow line(806)). And once decrypted, the decrypted virus code (810C) becomesunusable, and once the central processing unit (905) tries to executeit, the central processing unit (905) recognizes that the code is not inan understandable format, and therefore proceeds to ignore the encryptedcode, or kill the process, since it is not in the proper format for theoperating system (120) or for the central processing unit (905). Thevirus is, thus, destroyed.

Assuming that a virus is a worm. A worm is virus that after infectingone computer in a network then it migrates to other computers infectingthem all. Also, assuming that it was introduced in one connectedcomputer in the network while installing an infected software in thecomputer of the prior art, or after the computer of the prior art washacked. After the virus worm is executed by the computer of the priorart, it will migrate to other connected computer in the network, butonce it arrives in another computer hosting the digital-DNA, it willhave a problem, before the worm is executed in the new computer hostingthe digital-DNA, the operating system (120) of the new computer willfirst decrypt the worm with its own device with the value of theencryption decryption key—which is another form of encryption—, and theworm will have its code changed (FIG. 8C decrypted virus code (810C)),and once the central processing unit (905) tries to execute the newencrypted worm's code, it will not work and an error will ensure.

If a virus or worm (800C) is sent to an unsuspected user in an e-mail inthe form of a link which once clicked will redirect the user to amalicious website, or, in the form of an infected e-mail attachment.After the user clicks on the link or on the infected attachmentlaunching the worm, again, before the worm is executed, the operatingsystem (120) of the computer (130) will first decrypt the virus wormwith the encryption/decryption key (103) and in turn, the virus worm hasits code changed to gibberish (FIG. 8C decrypted virus code (810C)) andonce the central processing unit (905) tries to execute it, the centralprocessing unit will know that it is an un-authorized code and producesan error, or simply destroy it. Just as in a network, the virus wormwill be killed before it can be executed/processed in the computer,therefore preventing infection and/or damage.

The encryption/decryption processes disclosed in FIG. 8A and FIG. 8B arefor explanatory purposes only and not an actual result of anencryption/decryption. For instance, the digital-DNA (300) is not anactual XOR (or encryption of any form) between executable code, namelynon-encoded software (310) and the value in memory location (120-A).Similarly, in FIG. 8C, there is no actual encryption between the virusor worm (800C) and the encryption/decryption key (103) value in memorylocation (120-A). Since, there are many encryption algorithms availableand many ways to perform an encryption that, even if an actualencryption had been performed, the results would have varied.

Furthermore, it is not the objective of the present invention to teachor delve into the art of encryption, this art is well established andsince there are many encryption/decryption methods that may be used forpurposes of carrying out the methods disclosed herein.

Overview of a Preferred Embodiment

1) The operating system (120) of the present invention at theinstallation time of non-encoded software (310) encrypts the executablecode, i.e. encrypts the non-encoded software (310), producing thedigital-DNA (300), shown in FIG. 8A. The operating system (120) thensaves the digital-DNA (300) on the second non-transitory computerstorage medium (350) of the computer (130). 2) before the centralprocessing unit (905) executes the digital-DNA (300), the centralprocessing unit (905) or the operating system (120) decrypts itproducing an unencrypted executable code (the non-encoded software(310))), which the central processing unit (905) understands, then thecentral processing unit (905) executes it (the executable code alsoreferred to as the non-encoded software (310) of FIG. 8B). 3) if theoperating system (120) is requested to load a virus executable codewhich is unencrypted (800C), the operating system (120) decrypts it (theoperating system's behavior of the present invention is to first decryptan encrypted executable code before the central processing unit executesit) converting the virus code into the computer's digital-DNA (FIG. 8Cdecrypted virus code (810C)), and once the central processing unit (905)tries to execute the FIG. 8C decrypted virus code (810C), the virusbecomes gobbledygook that is un-executable because the centralprocessing unit (905) only executes unencrypted code.

Another preferred method includes the following three steps: 1) Theoperating system (120) at the installation time of executable code (i.e.the non-encoded software (310))) encrypts the executable code producingthe digital-DNA (300), shown in FIG. 8A, then saves it in the secondnon-transitory computer storage medium (350) of the computer; 2) beforethe central processing unit executes the digital-DNA (300), theoperating system (120) stores the encrypted version in random accessmemory (925), and decrypts it from random access memory (925) asrequested by the central processing unit (905), and the centralprocessing unit (905) executes it (the executable code also referred toas the non-encoded software (310) of FIG. 8B); 3) if the centralprocessing unit (905) is requested to execute a executable code of avirus or worm (800C) stored in the random access memory (925), which isunencrypted, the operating system (120) will decrypt it (the operatingsystem's behavior of the present invention is to first decrypt anencrypted executable code before it is executed) converting the viruscode into decrypted gobbledygook (FIG. 8C). Once the central processingunit (905) tries to execute the digital-DNA with the virus, the virusgets disabled because the central processing unit (905) unit onlyexecutes unencrypted code. While the operating system (120) is describedas performing the decryption of the digital-DNA (300), this may beinterpreted to mean that the decryption is performed by centralprocessing unit (905).

If an optional-header-identification-code (320) of FIG. 3 and FIG. 4 ispresent, then once a file execution is requested, the operating system(120) proceeds as follows: Once the operating system (120) decrypts theDigital-DNA (300), the operating system (120) will retrieve theoptional-header-identification-code (320) from the non-encoded software(310) and verify that it is valid. If valid, the operating system placesthe encrypted version of the non-encoded software (310)) in the randomaccess memory (925) of the computer (130) for execution by the centralprocessing unit (905) of the computer (130). If the headeridentification code is not there, the request to execute the softwarefile is disregarded and an error generated. If the software happens tobe a virus, then once the virus is decrypted (810C), the operatingsystem (120) will not be able to locate theoptional-header-identification-code (320) and the virus is disabled.

The device-with-encryption-decryption-key (100) may be used by theoperating system (120) of the computer (130) for other purposes, such asfor saving sensitive information that has to be available to theoperating system (120) of the computer (130).

Also, the device-with-encryption-decryption-key (100) may be used by theoperating system (120) to encrypt any kind of file and not limited to asoftware file. For instance, the encryption/decryption key (103) may beused by the operating system to encrypt a database file containingsensitive data like user's e-mail and other personal data to prevent aninadvertently installed virus from accessing its content for the purposeof proliferating itself to other computers unprotected with the presentinvention.

Further, if the device-with-encryption-decryption-key (100) isimplemented as an independent computer board, it may be a completecomputer (FIG. 9) on the board (the computer (130) and thedevice-with-encryption-decryption-key (100)), and the board installedinto a computer.

If the device-with-encryption-decryption-key (100) is used to encryptdata, then a software library may be developed at the operating systemlevel and integrated with developed software, thus enabling a softwareto call a function code in the library passing the data to be encrypted,and the operating system (120) using the encryption/decryption key (103)to encrypt the received data producing an encrypted data, then passingthe encrypted data back to the software, and the software saving it intothe database or file. The same will work for decrypting, the softwarepasses an encrypted data to the operating system (120), and theoperating system (120) returns decrypted data to the software.

By software it is meant to be interpreted broadly and not to apply tocompiled code only, it may be batch files, script files, system files,interpreted code files, compiled code files, etc. It is any kind of filethat the operating system, or the central processing unit, or aninterpreter program will interpret or execute in terms to be able toperform their functions.

Installation of a Device-with-Encryption-Decryption-Key

FIG. 10 illustrates the installation process using adevice-with-encryption-decryption-key (100) for the first time in thecomputer (130). The server computer (1000) has a database record (1000A)for every device-with-encryption-decryption-key (100) that ismanufactured. The record containing the serial-number (1002) of the solddevice-with-encryption-decryption-key (100) which is associated with thedevice-with-encryption-decryption-key-ID (1003) and with theencryption/decryption key (103), plus at least the optional softwaredriver (1001). The optional software driver (1001) is not required sincethe encryption/decryption of software is done at the computer (130) andmay be done exclusively by the operating system (120). Also, if theoptional software driver (1001) is used, it is preferably available on acompact disk, or it may be downloaded from server computer (1000) orprovided on another peripheral device.

The user begins by plugging (first arrow line (100A)) in thedevice-with-encryption-decryption-key (100) into the computer (130) (ifthe computer doesn't have one part of its circuitry). This initiates aregistration process. The user signs up on the server computer (1000)and provides through the operating system (120) or an installationdriver, the user's ID (1005), the user's password (1006) and thedevice-with-encryption-decryption-key-ID (1003). The operating system(120) then sends the entered information through a first secure link(1010) to the server computer (1000).

The server computer (1000) then uses thedevice-with-encryption-decryption-key-ID (1003) that is received as akey to enable it to fetch the database record (1000A). The enteredinformation (the user's ID (1005) and user's password (1006)) is savedin the database record (1000A) of the server computer (1000). Next, theserver computer (1000) fetches the optional software driver (1001) andthe serial-number (1002), then returns both via the first secure link(1010) to the operating system (120) of the computer (130).

Once the operating system (120) receives the transmission from theserver computer (1000), then the operating system (120) retrieves(twenty-first arrow line (1020)) from the latch memory (111), theencryption/decryption key (110) becomes the copied encryption/decryptionkey (120-A) under the control of the operating system (120)—FIG. 2B,FIGS. 3-4, FIG. 8A, FIG. 8B, and FIG. 8C. The operating system (120)clears the encryption/decryption key from the latch memory (111)thereafter. The operating system (120) then uses the copiedencryption/decryption key (120-A) to encrypt the received optionalsoftware driver (1001), producing (indicated by the twentieth arrow line(1060)) an encrypted software driver (1065). The operating system (120)then saves (twenty-third arrow line (1070)) the encrypted softwaredriver (1065) in the second non-transitory computer storage medium(350). Also, the operating system (120) encrypts the receivedserial-number (1002) to produce (nineteenth arrow line (1030)) anencrypted serial number (1045) of thedevice-with-encryption-decryption-key (100). The operating system (120)then associates the encrypted serial number (1045) with the unencryptedcopy-of-device-with-encryption-decryption-key-ID (1003A) in the file(1040), and finally saves (twenty-second arrow line (1055)) both to thesecond non-transitory computer storage medium (350).

The optional software driver (1001) that is received may or may not beencrypted, but for security reasons, it is preferred that it beencrypted. At the power up or reset of the computer (130), the operatingsystem (120) would then decrypt the encrypted software driver (1065),deriving the decrypted software driver (935).

The purpose of saving the encrypted serial number (1045) and theunencrypted copy-of-device-with-encryption-decryption-key-ID (1003A) ina file (1040) is to enable making a replacement for thedevice-with-encryption-decryption-key (100) at a later time, in case theuser loses the installed/original one.

FIG. 11 provides a flowchart describing the steps consistent with FIG.10. At step (1100), the user first plugs in thedevice-with-encryption-decryption-key (100) into the computer (130) andthe registration process begins. At step (1101), the user provides tothe operating system (120) the User's ID (1005), the user's password(1006), shown as User_PW, and thedevice-with-encryption-decryption-key-ID (1003), shown as DEDK_ID. Next,the operating system (120) sends the provided information to the servercomputer (1000) for registration through the first secure link (1010).

At step (1102), after the server computer (1000) validates the userprovided device-with-encryption-decryption-key-ID (1003), the servercomputer (1000) sends through the same first secure connection via firstsecure link (1010) to the operating system (120), the optional softwaredriver (1001), if any because it is optional, and the serial-number(1002) of the device-with-encryption-decryption-key (100).

At step (1104), after the operating system (120) receives theinformation from the server computer (1000), the operating system (120)retrieves a copy of the encryption/decryption key (103), which is thentermed the copied encryption/decryption key (110). The retrieval is fromlatch memory (111) of the device-with-encryption-decryption-key (100)and the retrieved copy becomes the copied encryption/decryption key(120-A) under the control of the operating system (120)—FIG. 2B, FIGS.3-4, FIG. 8A, FIG. 8B, and FIG. 8C.

At step (1105), the operating system (120) encrypts the optionalsoftware driver (1001) with the copied encryption/decryption key (120-A)producing an encrypted software driver (1065).

At step (1106), the operating system (120) saves the encrypted softwaredriver (1065) to the second non-transitory computer storage medium(350).

At step (1107), the operating system (120) using the copiedencryption/decryption key (120-A) encrypts the received serial-number(1002) of the device-with-encryption-decryption-key (100) producing anencrypted serial number (1045) then associating the encrypted serialnumber (1045) with the unencryptedcopy-of-device-with-encryption-decryption-key-ID (1003A).

At step (1108), the operating system (120) saves the encrypted serialnumber (1045) and the unencryptedcopy-of-device-with-encryption-decryption-key-ID (1003A) to a file(1040) in the second non-transitory computer storage medium (350).

Cradle Encodes a Replacement Device-with-Encryption-Decryption-Key

FIG. 12 illustrates a mechanism to solve the problem of a misplaced orlost universal serial bus device that is thedevice-with-encryption-decryption-key (100). Thedevice-with-encryption-decryption-key (100) is only to be used once atthe computer's power up and reset. Basically, it is an option for a userto insert the device-with-encryption-decryption-key (100) into auniversal serial bus port and then after the computer's power up orreset, then the user removes it. Preferably, thedevice-with-encryption-decryption-key (100) is programmed toautomatically isolate itself without the user's intervention.

If the user were to lose the device-with-encryption-decryption-key(100), the user would need to have the encryption/decryption key (103)in its original state replicated in a replacementdevice-with-encryption-decryption-key in order to gain access the user'scomputer. Providing a replacement device-with-encryption-decryption-keyis not a simple matter since security would be compromised if anysoftware could gain access to the encryption/decryption key (103).

The company manufacturing the device-with-encryption-decryption-key(100) preferably safely retains the encryption/decryption key (103) foreach device-with-encryption-decryption-key (100) as theencryption/decryption key (103). The manufacturer may, for example,match the serial-number (1002) of thedevice-with-encryption-decryption-key (100) to the encryption/decryptionkey (103). Any other kind of an identifier for matching may be used.Once the buyer registers the replacementdevice-with-encryption-decryption-key (100) as explained in FIGS. 10-11,the manufacturer associates the user with the replacementdevice-with-encryption-decryption-key (100) and its serial-number(1002).

Alternatively, a cradle (1235) is made available to enable thereplacement device-with-encryption-decryption-key to be inserted intoit. The cradle (1235) is preferably inserted into a computer's universalserial bus or any kind of port (see the thirty-fourth arrow line (1200B)in FIG. 12). Preferably, the cradle (1235) is the only device havingdirect contact with the device-with-encryption-decryption-key (100). Thecradle (1235) being this only device would prevent unwanted access tothe device-with-encryption-decryption-key (100).

The cradle (1235) receives the encryption/decryption key (103) in itsoriginal state from the server computer (1000) along with additionalinformation required for the operating system (120) to initiate thesaving of the encryption/decryption key (103) in its original state intoa new DEDK (1250). The operating system (120) preferably sends a signalor a code to the cradle (1235) connected to the computer (130). Thecradle (1235) in turn sends a signal to the new DEDK (1250) indicatingthat the new DEDK (1250) received the replacement for theencryption/decryption key (103). Then the new DEDK (1250) saves theencryption/decryption key (103) in its original state which would enablethe computer (130) to function with the replacement of theencryption/decryption key (103), and the new DEDK (1250) becomes the newdevice-with-encryption-decryption-key (100). The method of saving theencryption/decryption key in its original state into the new DEDK (1250)may be done by the cradle (1235), or by the new DEDK (1250).

The guiding precept is that: no software of any kind, other than theoperating system (120), should have direct access to thedevice-with-encryption-decryption-key (100). If it were otherwise, thena hacker code could be written with a specific purpose of reading theencryption/decryption key (103) from thedevice-with-encryption-decryption-key (100), or of saving a fakeencryption/decryption key therein for the purpose of defeating thesecurity of the device-with-encryption-decryption-key (100).

FIG. 12 illustrates the saved record in the server computer (1000)described in the teachings of FIG. 10. Once a user provides her/hiscredentials: The user's ID (1005), the user's password (1006) and thedevice-with-encryption-decryption-key-ID (1003) to the operating system(120), then the operating system (120) sends them through a secondsecure link (1200) to the server computer (1000).

After the server computer (1000) has verified the user's credentials.The server computer (1000) uses thedevice-with-encryption-decryption-key-ID (1003) as a record identifierand retrieves from the database record (1000A) the serial-number (1002)of the original device-with-encryption-decryption-key (100) and theencryption/decryption key (103) of the originaldevice-with-encryption-decryption-key (100), then the server computer(1000) returns the serial-number (1002) and the encryption/decryptionkey (103) via the second secure link (1200) to the operating system(120).

There are two ways for the operating system (120) to supply thedevice-with-encryption-decryption-key-ID (1003) to the server computer(1000). The user may supply it, or the operating system (120) mayprovide it. If the operating system (120) is to provide thedevice-with-encryption-decryption-key-ID (1003), then the operatingsystem (120) would fetch the unencryptedcopy-of-device-with-encryption-decryption-key-ID (1003A) from the file(1040) stored in the second non-transitory computer storage medium (350)of the computer (130) shown in FIG. 3, then senddevice-with-encryption-decryption-key-ID (1003A) to the server computer(1000) along with the user's supplied credentials: user identification,namely user's ID (1005) and user's password (1006), namely User-PW.

Once the operating system (120) receives through the second secure link(1200) the necessary information from the server computer (1000), theoperating system (120) proceeds to retrieve (twenty-seventh arrow(1210)) from the second non-transitory computer storage medium (350)shown in FIG. 3, of the computer (130), the record, namely the file(1040). The file (1040) contains the encrypted serial number (1045) ofthe device-with-encryption-decryption-key (100) and the unencryptedcopy-of-device-with-encryption-decryption-key-ID (1003A). Then theoperating system (120) uses the encryption/decryption key (103) that wasreceived and decrypts (twenty-fourth arrow line (1215)) the encryptedserial number (1045), producing the decrypted serial-number.

If the decrypted serial number matches with the received serial-number(1002), then the operating system (120) proceeds saving theencryption/decryption key (103) into the replacement for the new DEDK(1250) attached (thirty-third arrow line (1200A)) to the cradle (1235).If there is no match, then the process ends and the operating system(120) issues and error to the user.

After the operating system (120) finds a match, then the operatingsystem (120) proceeds and makes the encryption/decryption key (103)available via third secure link (1230) to the cradle (1235). The processof making the encryption/decryption key (103) available to the cradle(1235) may be performed by the operating system (120) or by any otherspecialized program, like a software driver (935), working inconjunction with the operating system (120). After theencryption/decryption key (103) is received by the cradle (1235), thecradle (1235) stores the encryption/decryption key (103) that wasreceived in cradle latch memory (1236).

Preferably, the cradle (1235) sends a signal through a fifth secure link(1240) to the attached new DEDK (1250) which is the tristate switch(106) of FIG. 1B. The cradle (1235) preferably, also sends a signalthrough a seventh secure link (1240A) to the new DEDK non-transitorycomputer storage medium (1260) of the attached new DEDK (1250), andthereafter the cradle (1235) transmits through the fourth secure link(1245) the received encryption/decryption key (103), which is stored inthe cradle latch memory (1236), to the latch memory, i.e. the new DEDKlatch memory (1251). Once the new DEDK (1250) receives theencryption/decryption key (103) through sixth secure link (1255), thenew DEDK (1250) stores the bytes of the received encryption/decryptionkey (103) in the new DEDK non-transitory computer storage medium (1260),which may be flash memory or other physical storage device. And the newDEDK (1250) becomes the new device-with-the-encryption-decryption-key(100).

Alternatively, the cradle (1235) writes the encryption/decryption key(103) received from the operating system (120) directly into the memorylocation in the new DEDK non-transitory computer storage medium (1260)of the new DEDK (1250). For instance, if the cradle (1235) writes theencryption/decryption key (103) in its original state directly into amemory location in the new DEDK non-transitory computer storage medium(1260), then the signal, sent through the fifth secure link (1240), maynot be used and the tristate switch (106) may not be present.

FIG. 13 illustrates the flowchart describing the steps taken consistentwith FIG. 12. It is assumed that the new DEDK (1250) with encryptiondecryption key is plugged into the cradle (1235).

At step 1300, the initiation of the process to retrieve theencryption/decryption key (103) from the server computer (1000) begins.

At step (1301), the user at the computer (130) provides the user's ID(1005), user's password (1006) and thedevice-with-encryption-decryption-key_ID (1003) to the operating system(120) of the computer (130). Then, the operating system (120) sends theuser's provided information to the server computer (1000) via secondsecure link (1200).

At step 1302, the server computer (1000) returns, via the second securelink (1200) to the operating system (120) of the computer (130), theserial-number (1002) of the device-with-encryption-decryption-key (100)and the encryption/decryption key (103).

At step 1303, the operating system (120) retrieves the encrypted serialnumber (1045) of the device-with-encryption-decryption-key (100) anddecrypts it with the received encryption/decryption key (103) deriving adecrypted serial number.

At step (1304), the operating system (120) determines if theserial-number that was decrypted matches the received serial-number(1002) of the device-with-encryption-decryption-key (100). If yes, thenthe operating system (120) sends the received encryption/decryption key(103) to be saved in the new DEDK non-transitory computer storage medium(1260) of the new DEDK (1250) and the process ends. If a match is notfound, the operating system (120) will alert the user and end theprocess.

Sofware Only Implmentation of the Invention

In an alternative embodiment, the method to achieve the same virusprotection is implemented with the use of software only, instead of acombination of software and hardware. In this arrangement, either amobile computer or a non-mobile computer holds a software applicationand the computer to be protected (client computer) also holds a softwareapplication. The software application in the computer (130) preferablyperforms encryption of executable codes therein, and therefore functionsas the software driver (935).

The software arrangement is a good fit for protecting laptop computersor any kind of transportable mobile device without requiring thepurchasing of a physical device with an encryption/decryption key. Inthis arrangement, the device-with-encryption-decryption-key is replacedby software implemented in the mobile device or the non-mobile computer.For simplicity of the discussion, applicant refers to the mobile deviceand intends that the discussion should be interpreted to apply also tothe non-mobile device, as may be appropriate.

FIG. 14 is consistent with FIG. 2A, FIG. 9, and FIG. 10. FIG. 14illustrates another embodiment that enables the same virus protection tobe implemented with the use of software only, that is, without the useof a physical hardware device (e.g., thedevice-with-encryption-decryption-key (100)). The mobile device (1430)of the user becomes the device-with-encryption-decryption-key (100). Aserver computer (1000) through eight secure connection, communicates(1460) with a mobile device (1430). The server computer (1000) alsocommunicates through ninth secure connection (1470) with the computer(130) of the user. The mobile device (1430) communicates with thecomputer (130) through a wireless connection, such as a Bluetoothconnection (1450).

A user accesses the server computer (1000) and obtains through eighthsecure connection (1460) a new application (1409) from the databaserecord (1000A) of the server computer (1000), which becomes a softwareapplication (1440) in the mobile device (1430). The user also downloadsan optional software driver (1001) from the database record (1000A) onthe server computer (1000) into the computer (130) and it becomessoftware driver (935) at the computer (130). The database record (1000A)is the same to the database record (1000A) in the server computer (1000)of the manufacturer while discussing FIG. 10 and FIG. 12, with some newitems/fields added to it. The serial-number (1002) is missing sincethere is not a physical device in the software only implementation ofthe invention. Instead of the serial-number (1002), the mobile device'sID (1407) is present and it is used for the same purpose to identify thedevice acting as the device-with-encryption-decryption-key (100), inthis embodiment, the mobile device (1430).

The user registers the software application (1440) with the servercomputer (1000), providing to the server computer (1000) a user's ID(1005) and user's password (1006). The server computer (1000) saves theuser's ID (1005) and user's password (1006) to its database record(1000A).

Then the server computer (1000) creates a mobile device's ID (1407), theencryption/decryption key (103), and a private key (1408), which issymmetric and used for encryption and decryption, then saving them inthe database record (1000A) of the server computer (1000). The mobiledevice's ID (1407) is used to identify the device acting as thedevice-with-encryption-decryption-key (100). The mobile device's ID(1407) has the same purpose as of the serial-number (1002) used toidentify the physical device, i.e. thedevice-with-encryption-decryption-key (100).

The term “symmetric” in “symmetric key,” or in variations of it, such asin “symmetrical private key schema,” is well-known term in the art andis used to signify that a single encryption key is used to encrypt anddecrypt.

In contrast, in an asymmetric encryption schema, also called public keyencryption, two keys are needed: a private key and a public key. Theprivate key is used by the message sender to encrypt a message; thepublic key is available to anyone who wishes to decrypt the messageencrypted with the private key.

In preferred embodiments of the devices and methods disclosed herein,the symmetrical private key schema is used. This means that preferablythe same key is used for encryption of an original software programproducing an encrypted software program, and for decryption of theencrypted software program to reproduce the original software program.

In FIG. 14, the server computer (1000) using the private key (1408)encrypts the encryption/decryption key (103), producing anencrypted-original-encryption/decryption-key.

Then the server computer (1000) transmits, via the eighth secureconnection (1460) the mobile device's ID (1407) and theencryption/decryption key (103) that is encrypted, to the mobile device(1430). After receiving, the mobile device (1430) saves the receivedencryption/decryption-key as anencrypted-original-encryption/decryption-key (1404A) and the receivedmobile_ID (1407) as first-copy-of-mobile_ID (1407A) in a file (1400B) inthe mobile device (1430) non-transitory medium (not shown).

The user uses the computer (130) through the software driver (935) (itcan be a separate software application downloaded from server computer(1000) as well, like new application (1409) or similar. But for sake ofsimplicity, the software driver will be used) provides the user's ID(1005), the user's password (1006), and the first-copy-of-mobile_ID(1407A), and the computer (130) logs into the server computer (1000) viathe ninth secure connection (1470). The server computer (1000) afterreceiving information sent from the computer (130), creates adevice-with-encryption-decryption-key-ID (1003) and after associating itwith the mobile device's ID (1407), saves thedevice-with-encryption-decryption-key-ID (1003) in the database record(1000A).

Then the server computer (1000) transmits to the computer (130) via theninth secure connection (1470) thedevice-with-encryption-decryption-key-ID (1003) and the private key(1408). The private key (1408) is used at a later step for decryption ofthe encrypted-original-encryption/decryption-key (1404A).

And once the computer (130) receives them from the server computer(1000), the computer (130) saves in the file or database record (1400A)in the second non-transitory computer storage medium (350) of thecomputer (130): the received first-copy-of-mobile_ID (1407A) assecond-copy-of-mobile_ID (1407B); the received private key (1408) ascopy-of-private-encryption-decryption-key (1408A); and the receiveddevice-with-encryption-decryption-key-ID (1003) ascopy-of-device-with-encryption-decryption-key-ID (1003A).

After both, the computer (130) and the mobile device (1430) communicatewith the server computer (1000) and registers with it, then the mobiledevice (1430) and the computer (130) are ready to communicate (1450)with each other. The user at the mobile device (1430) initiates thesoftware application (1440) and the software driver (935) on thecomputer (130). Then the computer (130) and the mobile device (1430)communicate through the software application (1440) and the softwaredriver (935) using the communication link, e.g. the Bluetooth connection(1450). The communication link, e.g. the Bluetooth connection (1450),can be any kind of link: wired or wireless.

Then the user types the first-copy-of-mobile_ID (1407A) into the mobiledevice (1430), and the mobile device (1430) transmits it to the computer(130) through the Bluetooth connection (1450) theencrypted-original-encryption/decryption-key (1404A).

Once the computer (130) receives the first-copy-of-mobile_ID (1407A) andthe encrypted-original-encryption/decryption-key (1404A), the computer(130) compares the received mobile first-copy-of-mobile_ID (1407A) withthe second-copy-of-mobile_ID (1407B) stored in the second non-transitorycomputer storage medium (350) of the computer (130), and if there is amatch, the computer (130) does the following:

1) sends an acknowledgement back to the client device, i.e. the mobiledevice (1430), and once the mobile device (1430) receives theacknowledgement, it ends the communication with the computer (130).

2) decrypts the received encrypted-original-encryption/decryption-key(1404A) with copy-of-private-encryption-decryption-key (1408A) derivinga decrypted encryption/decryption key (103);

3) uses the decrypted encryption/decryption key (103) to encrypt any newsoftware before installing it producing the digital-DNA (300) thensaving the digital-DNA (300) in the second non-transitory computerstorage medium (350) of the computer (130) as the only installedsoftware copy, decrypting the digital-DNA (300) of the computer (130)prior to its execution.

If anything happens to the mobile device (1430) such that theencrypted-original-encryption/decryption-key (1404A) is not available,or if the encrypted-original-encryption/decryption-key (1404A) is neededin another mobile device, then the following steps are implemented:

1) the user logs in with the computer (130) providing the user's ID(1005) and user's password (1006);

2) the computer (130) provides to the user the second-copy-of-mobile_ID(1407B);

3) the user installs a new application in the new mobile device,connects the new mobile device to the server computer (1000) through thenew application, and provides via eighth secure connection (1460) to theserver computer (1000) the user's ID (1005), the user's password (1006)and the mobile device's ID (1407) which is the received copy of thesecond-copy-of-mobile_ID (1407B) from the computer (130).

4) the server computer (1000) encrypts the encryption/decryption key(103) with the private key (1408) deriving an encryptedencryption/decryption key.

5) then, the server computer (1000) transmits via the eighth secureconnection (1460) the encrypted encryption/decryption key to the newmobile device.

6) then the new mobile device associates the encryptedencryption/decryption key with the mobile device's ID (1407) and savesthe encrypted encryption/decryption key and the mobile device's ID(1407) in the non-transitory storage of the new mobile device.

7) thereafter, the new mobile device will be able to communicate, e.g.using a Bluetooth connection (1450) with the computer (130), aspreviously.

If the invention is implemented on a mobile device (1430) and thecomputer (130) doesn't have wireless or Bluetooth connection (1450),then a universal serial bus device can be employed to plug into thecomputer (130) and used to communicate between the computer (130) andthe mobile device (1430). Or, the mobile device (1430) and computer(130) may communicate through the server computer (1000), wired orwireless connection.

A mobile device and a client have been illustrated but it can beimplemented between two mobile devices, or in between two clients, or inbetween two servers. As long two computing devices of any kind are ableto communicate, it will do.

Code Injection Hacking

Besides a plethora of viruses in the form of a computer file, hackershave in their arsenal one more destructive hacking method, and it iscode injection into a server's running process. Code injection may bedone in the user's client computer as well, but the focus of thisdisclosure is related to the server computer, but a client computer canbe affected, nonetheless.

FIG. 15 illustrates a method of remote code injection hacking commonlyin use today. The hacker at a hacker's client (1500) uses ahacker-server-access-connection (1515) to access a server (1510) and tryto discover a flaw in any software, i.e. a running process (1545),operating on the server (1510) or any hardware flaw which may be presentin the server (1510).

The hacker at the hacker's client (1500) running the terminal software(1530), the terminal software (1530) while connected through thehacker-server-access-connection (1515) with the server (1510), acts as awindow (1525) into the server (1510). Once a flaw in the server (1510)is found, the hacker then sends hacker's code (1550) from the window(1525) to a running process (1545) on the server (1510) (second dashedline (1227)). This process is called: code injection. Once the hackerusing terminal software (1530) gets inside the server (1510), the hackercan do any action at will, and in the majority cases, can do so withoutleaving any trace of its presence in the compromised server (1510).

The means for the hacker to inject executable code, namely the hacker'scode (1550), into a compromised computer, e.g. the server (1510), is thehacker's access to the running process (1545) on the server (1510). Thehacker's code (1550) is typically in the same format as the runningprocess (1545) and, the operating system on the server (1510) andcentral processing unit are not able to make any distinction of the twocodes in the random access memory of the server (1510). Therefore,executing both as if both are the native intended code of the runningprocess (1545) operating on the server (1510).

Code Execution of the Prior Art

Computers understand electronic signals and they are represented in theform of low-signal which is a zero “0”, and high-signal which is a one“1”. Before a program's code in the format written by a computerprogrammer is processed by the computer's central processing unit, theprogram-code gets compiled and each instruction of the program-code getstranslated into the format a computer understands: zeroes and ones.Zeroes and ones can also be converted into a hexadecimal formatequivalent. The explanations below employ the hexadecimal format.

A hexadecimal format is a form of translating values using asixteen-digit format, half byte we've discussed prior. For instance, wehumans use the decimal system because we have ten fingers in our hands,therefore, using the base ten is appropriate. Since computers use onlyzeroes and ones, then a binary system is used.

But as explained before, the computer architecture handles zeroes andones with the base of two. The values start with one, then one ismultiplied by two (base two), becoming four. And four is multiplied bytwo, becoming eight. And eight multiplied by two becoming sixteen, whichrepresents half-byte. A byte has “8” bits which represents the decimalvalues from “0-255”.

The hexadecimal format represents a half-byte values and it goes from“0-9” to represent the decimal values of “0-9”. The decimal equivalentfrom “10-16”, is represented as follows: “A=10”, “B=11”, “C=12”, “D=13”,“E=14” and “F=15”. Therefore from “0” to “15” has “16” numbers—a hex.

The hexadecimal representation still not a binary representation, but itis a representation that enables a programmer to explain what theunderlying binary value in the computer's memory is.

As an example, the hexadecimal value of “EF” is the equivalent decimalvalue of “239”. Conversion of the hexadecimal value “EF”: “E=14—decimal”and “14=1110—binary”; “F=15—decimal” and “15=1111—binary”. Therefore,the hexadecimal value becomes the binary value of: “11101111”, which isthe value of “239”. The hexadecimal value of “EF” becomes the binaryvalue ““11101111” stored into the computer's memory and executed by thecomputer's central processing unit. We'll be using hexadecimal valuesbut it is to be understood that what is stored in the computer's randomaccess memory is its binary equivalent.

FIG. 16 illustrates an exemplar code in the random access memory in theserver (1510). The running process (1545) having a code equivalent(1600). And the hacker's code (1550) having the hacker's code equivalent(1610). The code equivalent (1600) of the running process and hacker'scode equivalent (1610) are the computer executable code beingused/executed by the central processing unit of the server (1510). Thecode equivalent (1600) represents the actual computer code of therunning process (1545) which is executed by the central processing unitof the server (1510). The hacker's code equivalent (1610) represents thehacker's code (1550), also the actual computer code which is executed bythe central processing unit of the server (1510)

As illustrated, the format for the code equivalent (1600) for therunning process (1545) is the same code format for the hacker's codeequivalent (1610) for the hacker's code (1550. The central processingunit of the server (1510) does not distinguish the code equivalent(1600) that is intended and which is the good code, from thenon-intended code, which is the hacker's code equivalent (1610).Therefore, the central processing unit of the server (1510) executesboth.

Encrypting Random Access Memory Data

FIG. 17 illustrates the execution of encrypted code and data stored inthe computer's random access memory using a preferred method disclosedherein. The running process (1545) has the code equivalent (1600) andthe hacker's code (1550) has the hacker's code equivalent (1610), asexplained above in regard to FIG. 16. The code equivalent (1600) isencrypted with the encryption/decryption key (103) producing theencrypted code (1710). The encrypted code (1710) becomes the new codeequivalent for the running process (1545) which is stored into therandom access memory (925) of the server (1510) for execution by thecentral processing unit (905) of the server (1510).

Each byte of the encryption/decryption key (103) is used to encrypt (byXORing in this example) one byte of the code equivalent (1600) of therunning process (1545) producing one byte of the encrypted code (1710)that is stored in the random access memory (925) of the server (1510).The encrypted code (1710) becomes the new encrypted code equivalent forthe running process (1545). As illustrated, the hacker's code (1550) isstored as is without any encryption, since the hacker does not haveaccess to the encryption/decryption key (103).

Executing Encrypted Code from Random Access Memory

When stopping code injection into a process (program) running in therandom access memory (925) of the computer (130), the operating system(120) may function a differently than as already explained for stoppingvirus infection of the software program (330).

As already explained, in applying a preferred method for stopping virusinfection of non-encoded software (310), the operating system (120)decrypts the encrypted software file (the digital-DNA (300)) and storesthe decrypted version, the non-encoded software (310), into the randomaccess memory (925) of the computer (130). The mentioning of thecomputer (130) is to be interpreted as to cover the server (1510) aswell.

In order to provide more rigorous computer protection, a preferredmethod must preclude the hacker's code (1550) from being injected into arunning process in the random access memory (925) of the computer (130).

Instead of the operating system (120) decrypting the encrypted softwareprogram, namely the digital-DNA (300), and storing the non-encodedsoftware (310) in the random access memory (925) of the computer (130),the operating system (120), instead decrypts theoptional-header-identification-code (320) and if it valid, e.g. containsthe phrase “VALIDATED DNA”, the operating system (120) removes theoptional-header-identification-code (320) and stores the encryptedversion software file code, the digital-DNA (300), into the randomaccess memory (925) of the computer (130).

FIG. 18 illustrates this preferred method where the central processingunit (905) working in conjunction with random access memory auxiliary(952) processes encrypted code stored in the random access memory (925)of the computer (130). The address bus lines (1850), the data bus lines(1806), and the read/write line (1805) of the central processing unit(905) are connected to the random access memory auxiliary (952).Whenever, the central processing unit (905) needs code for processing(data), or execution (computer instruction code), or data to be storedinto the random access memory (925), the central processing unit (905)sets a signal on read/write line (1805). In our exemplar explanation, ifthe read/write line (1805) has a low “0” value, it indicates a read fromthe random access memory (925), if it has a high “1”, it indicates awrite into the random access memory (925).

The central processing unit (905) sets the read/write line (1805) to “0”indicating a read, and it also places a value on the address bus lines(1850) indicating the location in random access memory (925) it intendsto read. The random access memory auxiliary (952) proceeds andcalculates which the byte value of the encryption/decryption key (103)it will use to decrypt the encrypted stored byte in random access memory(925) addressed by a value the central processing unit (905) has placedof the address bus lines (1850).

The random access memory auxiliary (952) takes a modulus between thevalue of the address bus lines (1850) and the length of theencryption/decryption key (103) deriving the encryption/decryptionbyte-value (random access memory address at the address bus lines (1850)MOD length of the encryption/decryption key (103)). Then: [a] if thederived encryption/decryption byte-value is zero, using the last bytevalue of the encryption/decryption key (103); [b] if the derivedencryption/decryption byte-value is non-zero, using the derived non-zerovalue to point to a location of the encryption/decryption key (103),then using the respective value of the encryption/decryption key (103)where the derived non-zero value has pointed to decrypt the locationbyte-value of the random access memory (925) addressed by the addressbus lines (1850) of the central processing unit (905).

If it is assumed that the location of the random access memory (925)addressed by the central processing unit (905) is the first location,location “1” with the encrypted value of “6A”. The random access memoryauxiliary (952) takes the modulus between the length of theencryption/decryption key (103) which is “4” and the location addresswhich “1”, the modulus operand result will be “1” (1 mod 4=1) and thefirst byte of the value “C4” of the encryption/decryption key (103) isused in an XOR operation to decrypt (twenty-eight arrow line (1820)) thevalue “6A” deriving the decrypted value (twenty-ninth arrow line(1830)). Then the random access memory auxiliary (952) returns thedecrypted value “AE” to the central processing unit (905) using the databus lines (1806), and the central processing unit (905) executes theinstruction value “AE” (1855).

Next, the central processing unit (905) requests the next byte atlocation “2”. Then the random access memory auxiliary (952) takes amodulus between the byte location “2” and the encryption/decryption keylength which is “4” deriving the modulus value of “2” (2 mod 4=2). Therandom access memory auxiliary (952) uses the second byte “DA” of theencryption/decryption key (103) and in XOR operation (thirty-first arrowline (1825)) decrypts the byte-value “18” of the byte memory location“2” deriving the decrypted value (thirtieth arrow line (1835)). Thenrandom access memory auxiliary (952) returns the derived decrypted valueof “C2” to the central processing unit (905) using the data bus lines(1806). And lastly, the central processing unit (905) executes thedecrypted instruction byte-value “C2” (1860).

If a byte value is to be stored in the random access memory (925) of thecomputer (130), the same process regarding the taking of the modulusoperand between the length of the encryption/decryption key (103) andthe location of the random access memory (925), takes place. Except, thebyte of the encryption/decryption key (103) is used to encrypt the valuethat the central processing unit (905) intends to store in the randomaccess memory (925) which is present on the data bus line (1806).

In this process, the central processing unit (905) does the following:[a] places a high value of “1” in the read/write line (1805) indicatinga writing operation to the random access memory (925); [b] places on theaddress bus lines (1850) the value indicating the location of the randomaccess memory (925) in intend to store a data value to; and [c] placesthe value it intends to store in a location of the random access memory(925) on the data bus lines (1806). Then the random access memoryauxiliary (952) does the following: [a] takes a modulus between thevalue at the address bus lines (1850) and the length of theencryption/decryption key (103); [b] uses the modulus result to fetch abyte from the encryption/decryption key (103); [c] uses the fetched byteand encrypts the value at the data bus line (1806) deriving theencrypted byte-value; and [d] stores the encrypted byte-value in thelocation of the random access memory (925) addressed by the value on theaddress bus lines (1850).

As an example, it is assumed that the central processing unit (905)places the value of “5” on the address bus lines (1850) and a highsignal “1” at the read/write line (1805) indicating a writing at thelocation “5” of the random access memory (925) of the computer (130),and a hex value of “CB” in the data bus lines (1806).

The random access memory auxiliary (952) will take a modulus between thelength of the encryption/decryption key (103) “4” and the value of “5”at the address bus lines (1850), and the result will be “1” (5 mod 4=1).The random access memory auxiliary (952) then takes the first byte-value“C4” from the encryption/decryption key (103) and encrypt (XOR) the databus hex value “CB” deriving the encrypted byte-value “0F”. Then therandom access memory auxiliary (952) stores the hex value “0F” into thelocation “5” of the random access memory (925) (not shown).

If the modulus operation of the address location “4” and the length ofthe encryption/decryption key (103) of “4” will produce a zero (4 mod4=0), any time the modulus operation result is “0”, the last byte of theencryption/decryption key (103) value is used, “26” in our example. Ifthe modulus result is different than zero, then the modulus result'svalue is used to locate the byte of the encryption/decryption key (103)value to be used for encryption/decryption.

Preferably, the random access memory auxiliary (952) has a direct accessconnection (fourth dashed line (953)) to the random access memory (925)of the computer (130) and it also has direct access (third dashed line(953-A)) to a copy of the encryption/decryption key located in the latchmemory (111) or in the first-non-transitory computer storage medium(104) of the device-with-encryption-decryption-key (100) (not shown).

Also, the device-with-encryption-decryption-key (100) may beincorporated into the random access memory auxiliary (952). When it is,then there will be no need to disable thedevice-with-encryption-decryption-key (100) after the reading the copyof the encryption/decryption key (103) which is stored at the latchmemory (111) of the device-with-encryption-decryption-key (100). Or ifthe device-with-encryption-decryption-key (100) is incorporated into therandom access memory auxiliary (952) then the latch memory (111) may notbe present and the device-with-encryption-decryption-key (100) may onlyhave the first-non-transitory computer storage medium (104).

The random access memory auxiliary (952) also may be used toencrypt/decrypt software files to derive digital-DNA, as well.

The random access memory auxiliary (952) and central processing unit(905) may be integrated into a single unit.

It may also be implemented where the central processing unit (905) has asmart random access memory controller comprising the random accessmemory auxiliary (952) integrated into it.

Executing Injected Code from Random Access Memory

FIG. 19 illustrates what happens once the hacker's code (1550), which isun-encrypted (represented as hacker's code equivalent (1610)) of thehacker's code (1550), is injected into the random access memory (925).Since the behavior of the random access memory auxiliary (952) is todecrypt digital-DNA code (encrypted program code) from the random accessmemory (925) before returning it to the central processing unit (905),once a request for the execution of the hacker's code equivalent (1610)arrives at the central processing unit (905) of the computer (130) andthe random access memory auxiliary (952) gets to it, the random accessmemory auxiliary (952) using the encryption/decryption key (103) willdecrypt the hacker's code equivalent (1610) turning it into unusablecode and is essentially a jumbled-hacker's-code (1900) which the centralprocessing unit (905) cannot execute.

Once the central processing unit (905) tries and fails to execute thejumbled-hacker's-code (1900), the central processing unit (905) disablesthe jumbled-hacker's-code (1900) in the random access memory (925),generating an interrupt error. The operating system (120) generates anerror to the user, ending the execution of the jumbled-hacker's-code(1900), thus preventing the action intended to be implemented by thehacker's code (1550). Alternatively, this operation may be performedwithout the random access memory auxiliary (952). A software driver(935) running on the random access memory (925) may be employed toperform the same functionality of performing the modulus operation withthe length of the encryption/decryption key (103) and the intendedlocation address of the random access memory (925) then using the byteretrieved from the encryption/decryption key (103) to encrypt/decryptsoftware code from the random access memory (925).

Operating System Loading of the Prior Art

FIG. 20 illustrates loading the operating system as currently performedin the art once a computer is first turned on. There are essentially twomethods of loading the operating system. In the first method, at thecomputer's power up, the prior art ROM-BIOS (2030) loads the operatingsystem stored in the computer's hard disk (2020) for execution into therandom access memory.

In the second method, the computer is started via a peripheralattachment, such as a compact disk or a dongle (2000) that holds theoperating system. When the compact disk or the dongle (2000) isconnected to the computer at the time of startup, the prior art ROM-BIOS(2030) first accesses the dongle (2000) and determines whether or not anoperating system is present and properly configured on the dongle(2000). If the operating system is present in the compact disk or thedongle (2000) and properly configured, then at the computer's power up,the prior art ROM-BIOS (2030) loads the operating system from thecompact disk or the dongle (2000) and stores it for execution in therandom access memory of the computer.

The obvious disadvantages of the prior art's loading of the operatingsystem from the dongle (2000) is that, once the operating system isloaded into random access memory, whatever computer virus is present onthe compact disk or the dongle (2000), will automatically be loaded intothe computer on the random access memory along with the operatingsystem. And once there, the computer virus proceeds and infect thecomputer. Once such virus infects the operating system on computer'shard disk (2020), then it is possible for the virus to be executedfirst, before executing the operating system. Basically, when thishappens, the virus takes control of the computer before the operatingsystem in the computer's hard disk (2020) is even loaded.

Operating System Loading

FIG. 21 illustrates a preferred embodiment with the loading of theoperating system using the new methods disclosed herein. An attacheddongle has a first switch (2105) which if closed, indicates to the basicinput/output system (2130) to load the operating system stored in thethird-non-transitory computer storage medium of the dongle. Theoperating system on second non-transitory computer storage medium (350)also has a second switch (2135) which if closed, indicates to the basicinput/output system (2130) to load the operating system stored in thesecond non-transitory computer storage medium (350) of the computer(130).

As per the illustration in FIG. 21, the first switch (2105) is turnedoff (opened) and the second switch (2135) is turned on (closed). In thisillustration, the basic input/output system (2130) using theencryption/decryption key (103), reads the operating system (120) fromthe second non-transitory computer storage medium (350) and decrypts theoperating system (120) using the encryption/decryption key (103), thenstores the operating system (120) that has been decrypted for executionin the random access memory (925) of the computer (130).

In an alternative embodiment, the basic input/output system (2130) loadsthe operating system that is encrypted into the random access memory(925) of the computer (130). Then, once the central processing unit(905) is instructed to execute it, the basic input/output system (2130)(or the random access memory auxiliary (952)) using theencryption/decryption key (103) performs the decryption, using the samemechanism using the modulus, as has been explained in the discussionabove relating to FIG. 18. Alternatively, the basic input/output system(2130) loads the encrypted operating system into random access memory(925) and decryption is performed by the random access memory auxiliary(952), as has been explained in the discussion above relating to FIG.18.

FIG. 22 illustrates a preferred embodiment of the new method disclosedherein, once the first switch (2105) is turned on connecting the dongleto the basic input/output system (2130) and second switch (2135) isturned off, disconnecting the ability of the operating system (120) tobe loaded from second non-transitory computer storage medium (350). Inthis arrangement, the basic input/output system (2130) turnsoff/disconnects the device-with-encryption-decryption-key (100) from thecomputer (as per the illustration in FIG. 22, thedevice-with-encryption-decryption-key (100) is not present), therefore,not allowing any program from the dongle to read theencryption/decryption key (103).

There are two ways of implementing the basic input/output system (2130)handling of the dongle. The first, it may be implemented such that thebasic input/output system (2130) wouldn't allow the operating systemstored in the third non-transitory computer storage medium (2100) to beloaded. The second, the basic input/output system (2130) allow theoperating system stored in the third non-transitory computer storagemedium (2100) of the dongle to be loaded into the random access memory(925) of the computer (130). If the second arrangement is implemented,and if the dongle happens to be infected by a computer virus, and if thecomputer virus infects the computer. And as taught before, once thecomputer is powered up and loading of the operating system of FIG. 21takes place, the virus will be disabled because it is not encrypted. Ifthe computer virus happens to be an operating system infector andinfects the operating system (120) stored in the second non-transitorycomputer storage medium (350) of the computer (130), then once thecomputer (130) is restarted with the arrangement of FIG. 21, thecomputer virus will be disabled because the operating system (120)stored in the second non-transitory computer storage medium (350) of thecomputer (130) is encrypted and the operating system loader softwareroutines will work normally because it will get decrypted by the basicinput/output system (2130), but the infecting virus code will bedisabled because it lacks encryption and once the basic input/outputsystem (2130) decrypts it, it becomes gibberish.

It is preferably that only one switch be closed at once, either firstswitch (2105) or second switch (2135): If one is on, the other is off.In preferred embodiments, both switches are not closed or opened at thesame time. It is possible that a single switch be used, if it is on,load one operating system, if is off, load the other operating system.

A dongle has been illustrated, but it can be a compact disk in a compactdisk reader or any other plugin device attached to the computer andaccessible by the basic input/output system.

Also, the operating system (120) stored in the second non-transitorycomputer storage medium (350) of the computer (130) typically is theprimary operating system, the attached operating system on the dongle istypically the secondary operating system.

The first switch (2105) and the second switch (2135) may be mechanicalor electronic. If mechanical, the switch will be set manually. Ifelectronic, the switch may be set manually or by a software.

The basic input/output system (2130) is any software (embedded or not)which the central processing unit (905) of the computer (130) uses atthe startup to decrypt the operating system (120) stored in the secondnon-transitory computer storage medium (350) of the computer (130) andload it into random access memory (925) of the computer (130), or toload operating system stored in the third-non-transitory computerstorage medium (2100) of the dongle into the random access memory (925)of the computer (130) and disable thedevice-with-encryption-decryption-key (100). It may be part of thecomputer (130), or in the central processing unit (905), or stored in aROM (e.g., the basic input/output system (2130)), flash memory,Electrical Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory, etc.

Comparison Between a Computer and a Human being

The new method and device disclosed herein may also be illustrated bycomparison between the computer (130) and a human being. The computer(130) may be compared to a human body in the sense that a computer virusadversely affects the normal operation of a computer and a humaninfecting virus adversely affects the health of the human being.

FIG. 23 illustrates such comparison. First, making the comparison withthe prior art, then at the very end, with the present invention. On theleft is a human, and on the right a computer.

Step (1): a human catches a virus—a computer catches a computer virus;

Step (2): the human virus spreads to other humans—a computer virusspreads to other computers;

Step (3): an infected human stay in bed and loses days of work—aninfected computer isn't able to fully perform;

Step (4): a sick human goes to a doctor—a computer technician pays avisit to an infected computer;

Step (5): the doctor prescribes medication to the sick human—thetechnician runs an antivirus software in the infected computer;

Step (6): and, the human takes the prescribed medicine and getshealed—the antivirus cleans the computer and the computer gets back tonormal operation.

Once a vaccine is invented to combat the virus, the virus no longeraffects the human—the present invention is a computer vaccine, and onceit is applied in the computer, computer viruses can no longer affect thecomputer.

CONCLUSION

The processes for enabling computer virus prevention as disclosed hereinare preferably performed by a combination of hardware and software. If avirus is injected into a computer possessing thedevice-with-encryption-decryption-key (100), it is injected in anunencrypted form into the computer's digital-DNA, which is encrypted. Inorder to be run on the computer, the virus would necessarily be runthrough a decryption step using the encryption/decryption key (103).This destroys the operability of the virus before the virus can beexecuted.

The method and devices disclosed do not require specially-designedsoftware application programs. Therefore, the same operationalapplication programs in their original un-encoded state could be used atany computer. However, each operational application program installedusing the method and devices disclosed herein is installed to anencrypted state, i.e. what is termed, the digital-DNA (300) of thecomputer (130).

The methods and devices disclosed herein will work on any operationalapplication program as long as the computer (130) has access to thedevice-with-encryption-decryption-key (100).

When the operational application program in its encrypted state isexecuted in a computer with the device-with-encryption-decryption-key(100), the encryption/decryption key (103) is used to first decrypt whatis needed to execute the operational application program.

Preferred methods and devices disclosed herein only require a singleencryption key (the encryption/decryption key (103)) for all operationalapplication programs, which must be installed using thedevice-with-encryption-decryption-key (100). A single key is needed forevery installed operational application program, not a plurality ofencryption keys for installed programs. Further, this single key is kepthidden from any running process, is available only once at the power-upor reset of the computer, and is only available to authorized software.

The encryption/decryption key (103) is a private key system(symmetrical) for encrypting and decrypting, not a public-key-system(asymmetrical) where a private key is used for encryption and a publickey is used for decryption. If a public-key-system were to be used, theprivate key will be the one used for encrypting the software code andthe public-key will be used by the computer to do the decrypting theencrypted software code. Anyone possessing the private-key will be ableto encrypt virus program and the encrypted virus program will bedecrypted in the computer since the computer uses the public-key fordecryption. Therefore, the public-key-system allows a computer virus tobe introduced into the computer.

The encryption/decryption key (103) is not stored on the computer's harddisk, since, if the key were to be stored in the computer's hard disk,anyone could then copy it and then use it to encrypt a software virus torun in the computer, or use it to encrypt a code to be injected into arunning process of the computer.

In either case: use of a public key or a key stored in the computer'shard disc, would increase the potential for viral infection and loss ofthe computer's security.

Preferred methods and devices disclosed herein execute software codethat has been converted to the computer's digital-DNA. If an un-encodedprogram is present in the computer as software file, the file will notbe executed by the central processing unit (905) of the computer (130).Or, if the executable software code is un-encoded process in the randomaccess memory (925) of the computer (130), the central processing unit(905) will not execute it. This functionality only happens because thebehavior of the operating system (120) and central processing unit (905)change from what it would otherwise be using current computermethodology and technology.

In a preferred embodiment, before the operating system (120) loads asoftware file into the random access memory (925) of the computer (130),it will decrypt it, and if it doesn't have a valid format, the operatingsystem (120) will not load it into the random access memory (925) of thecomputer (130). If it has a valid format, the operating system (120)will load the encrypted version, i.e. digital-DNA (300). The same istrue for un-encoded software code loaded into the random access memory(925) of the computer (130), once it gets decrypted it will be in aformat not known to the central processing unit (905). The operatingsystem (120) designates if it has a valid format by reading theoptional-header-identification-code (320) part of the encrypted softwarecode, i.e. the digital-DNA (300), if theoptional-header-identification-code (320) is valid, then the operatingsystem (120) loads the code.

In another embodiment, the operating system (120) decrypts thedigital-DNA (300), i.e. the first-encrypted software program, and loadsit into the random access memory (925) of the computer (130), and ifprior to decryption, the software happens to be an un-encoded version,it will become encrypted and therefore the computer will not run it.

If the device-with-encryption-decryption-key (100) is used with acomputer that already has executable programs installed thereon, thenthe provided driver or another program will first, before using thedevice-with-encryption-decryption-key (100), encrypt all the installedexecutables deriving the computer digital-DNA for each installedsoftware file, then will use the device-with-encryption-decryption-key(100) thereafter to install new executables, and to decrypt digital-DNAsstored therein before their execution.

Preferred methods and devices disclosed herein operate automaticallywithout requiring user's intervention to insert an encryption and/or adecryption key for the operating system's encryption/decryptionoperation, or to supply a user's identification and/or password for theoperation of the encryption/decryption. And without requiring the use ofa dedicated central processing unit within thedevice-with-encryption-decryption-key to: manage the enabling ordisabling of the device-with-encryption-decryption-key (100); or toenable or disable the encryption/decryption key (103) within thedevice-with-encryption-decryption-key (100); or to move code (executableor data) from one storage location to another within thedevice-with-encryption-decryption-key (100); or to move theencryption/decryption key (103) from one storage location to anotherwithin the device-with-encryption-decryption-key (100).

Preferably, the device-with-encryption-decryption-key (100) is easy tobuild and of low cost, without downgrading the device with the securityof the device-with-encryption-decryption-key (100) and doesn't requireseparate computer code for its operation.

The central processing unit (905) does the requests for data/code to beread from, or stored to the random access memory (925), but does not dothe actual encryption/decryption. The encryption/decryption is done by achip or software which is not part of current central processing unit'sarchitecture nor is it necessary for the central processing unit'sfunctioning as currently implemented into central processing unit'stechnologies.

It is within the scope of the present disclosure that non-preferredmethods and devices may be implemented into the central processing unit(905) to be designed in the future, and the encryption/decryption may bedone by the actual central processing units. If implemented into thecentral processing unit, then the encryption/decryption key (103) may bepart of the central processing unit, like registers are part of everycentral processing unit, and the encryption/decryption key (103) may bestored into special register inside the central processing unit.

The disclosure that the central processing unit (905) is doing theencryption/decryption should be interpreted broadly to include acombination of the central processing unit (905) and the random accessmemory auxiliary (952). Or a combination of the central processing unit(905) and a memory management controller, if thedevice-with-encryption-decryption-key (100) is implemented at the memorymanagement controller. Or a combination of the central processing unit(905) and any other program (operating system or driver), or computerchip used to work in synchrony with the central processing unit (905)doing the encryption of code sent by the central processing unit (905)to be stored in the random access memory (925) of the computer (130), ordoing the decryption of encrypted executable code or data stored in therandom access memory (925) of the computer (130), once the executablecode or data is requested by the central processing unit (905).

Preferred methods and devices disclosed herein may be implemented withan API (Application Program Interface) where a program platform like acode interpreter interpreting executable code (or any other kind ofprogram), e.g. PHP, ASP.NET, JSP™, etc., the platform program takes adecrypted file-code and passes to the API and the API using theencryption/decryption key (103) encrypts the file and sends it back tothe platform, or the platform sends an encrypted file-code and receivesa decrypted one.

The term “computer” or the term “server” are interchangeable and arebroadly defined so that when the computer (130) is used, the server(1510) may be substituted therefor, and vice versa.

It was mentioned throughout the disclosure the encryption/decryption key(103), it is to be broadly interpreted to mean that theencryption/decryption key (103) is stored in the non-transitory memorycells of the first-non-transitory computer storage medium (104) of thedevice-with-encryption-decryption-key (100). It has been mentioned thecopied encryption/decryption key (110), it is to be broadly interpretedto mean that the copied encryption/decryption key (110) is stored in thelatch memory cells of the latch memory (111) of thedevice-with-encryption-decryption-key (100).

The above-described embodiments including the drawings are examples ofthe invention and merely provide illustrations of the invention. Otherembodiments will be obvious to those skilled in the art. Thus, the scopeof the invention is determined by the appended claims and their legalequivalents rather than by the examples given.

INDUSTRIAL APPLICABILITY

The invention has application to the computer industry.

What is claimed is:
 1. A method for preventing hacker code frominfecting an application program, the method requiring decryption of theapplication program prior to running the application program on acomputer, the computer comprising a non-transitory computer storagemedium; random access memory; a central processing unit; and anoperating system, the operating system stored in the non-transitorycomputer storage medium of the computer, the method comprising the stepsof: providing a storage device comprising a non-transitory computerstorage medium, said storage device being a separate unit fromcomponents necessary to operate the computer; storing a symmetricprivate key on the storage device, the symmetric private key beingsymmetric in that it is usable for encryption and decryption of theapplication program stored in the random access memory of the computer;using the symmetric private key to produce an encrypted applicationprogram upon first installation of the application program on thecomputer, the encrypted application program comprising encryptedoperational instructions needed to run the application program, suchthat after such first installation, the encrypted application program isthe only installed version of the application program on the computer;upon receiving a command to run the application program, loading theencrypted application program into the random access memory of thecomputer; requiring the central processing unit to decrypt, using thesymmetric private key, that part of the encrypted application programneeded implement the command to run the application program; precludingthe computer from running any part of the application program that hasnot been first encrypted with the symmetric private key; and, requiringthe central processing unit to decrypt, on the fly, only those follow-onparts of the encrypted application program needed to perform functionscalled for during operation of the application program.
 2. The method ofclaim 1, further comprising the steps of: producing a modulus value bycausing the central processing unit to perform a modulus operand usingbetween an address bus value and a length of the symmetric private keyto derive a remainder, using the remainder to locate a byte location ofthe symmetric private key; using the modulus value to point to a bytevalue in the symmetric private key; requiring the central processingunit to use the byte value for decryption of any follow-on parts of theencrypted application program needed to perform functions called forduring operation of the application program.
 3. The method of claim 1,further comprising the steps of: receiving a hacker code on thecomputer, the hacker code containing a non-encrypted softwareinstruction that if executed would implement an unwanted operationalcommand; retaining the hacker code only in the random access memory ofthe computer along with the encrypted application program; receiving arequest from the central processing unit to execute the non-encryptedsoftware instruction of the hacker code stored in the random accessmemory of the computer; decrypting the non-encrypted softwareinstruction of the hacker code using the symmetric private key, saiddecrypting producing a non-functional software instruction; and thecentral processing unit terminating attempted execution of thenon-functional software instruction.
 4. The method of claim 1, furthercomprising the step of preventing access to the symmetric private keyafter the symmetric private key is successfully used to produce theencrypted application program, unless express authorization is firstobtained.
 5. The method of claim 1, further comprising the step oflimiting the storage device to a microchip integrated into a motherboardof the computer, said microchip not having a dedicated centralprocessing unit.
 6. The method of claim 1, further comprising the stepof preventing access to the symmetric private key by implementing aprocedure selected from the group consisting of producing and sending anautomated signal from an operating system of the computer to the storagedevice, acting on manual input by a user at said computer, automaticallyusing a tristate switch, and causing the operating system to change avalue in a flag to one recognized as a command to prevent such access.7. The method of claim 1, further comprising the step of limiting thenon-transitory computer storage medium of the storage device tonon-transitory computer storage medium selected from the groupconsisting of an electronic chip, and a removable compact disk.
 8. Themethod of claim 1, further comprising the step of hosting the storagedevice in an electronic chip integrated into the computer.
 9. The methodof claim 8, further comprising the steps of: hosting a first-electronictristate switch in the electronic chip; and activating thefirst-electronic tristate switch in order to prevent access to thesymmetric private key.
 10. The method of claim 9, further comprising thesteps of: hosting a second-electronic tristate switch in the electronicchip; and activating the second-electronic tristate switch in order toprevent reading of the symmetric private key from the read-access memoryof the computer.
 11. A storage device for improving operation of acomputer to provide it immunity from infection of a software program bya software virus or in memory software code injection, the storagedevice comprising: a first non-transitory computer storage mediuminstalled within a unit that is separate from components necessary forthe operation of the computer; a symmetric private key usable forencryption and decryption of a software program, the symmetric privatekey stored on the first non-transitory computer storage medium withinthe unit; a second non-transitory computer storage medium that isnecessary for operation of the computer, the second non-transitorycomputer storage medium storing computer code operable to: enable thecomputer to which the unit is connected to use the symmetric private keyto encrypt a software program upon first installation of the softwareprogram and thereby create a first-encrypted software program; requirethe computer to use the symmetric private key upon each startup of thefirst-encrypted software program to decrypt the first-encrypted softwareprogram to produce a first-decrypted software program; execute thefirst-decrypted software program on the computer; prevent access to thesymmetric private key after the symmetric private key is first accessedto produce the first-decrypted software program, unless expressauthorization is first obtained; and preclude running on the computerany software program that has not been encrypted with the symmetricprivate key.
 12. The storage device of claim 11, wherein the firstnon-transitory computer storage medium is incorporated into a componentselected from the group consisting of an electronic chip, a computerboard, a wireless communication device, a central processor unit, and auniversal serial bus device.
 13. The storage device of claim 11, furthercomprising: an electronic chip incorporating the unit; an electronictristate switch in the electronic chip; and the electronic chipconfigured to activate the electronic tristate switch to preventtransfer of the symmetric private key from the first non-transitorycomputer storage medium a second time while the electronic chip ispowered-up.
 14. A storage device for storing a secure key, the storagedevice comprising: a non-transitory computer storage medium installedwithin a unit that can be operationally connected to a computer, theunit being separate from components necessary for operation of thecomputer; a secure key usable as input data to computer code running onthe computer to which the storage device is connected, the secure keystored on the non-transitory computer storage medium; computer code foroperation of the computer, the computer code operable to: read thesecure key; use the secure key as input data; and prevent access to thesecure key a second time after the secure key is first accessed by thecomputer to run any program.
 15. The storage device of claim 14, whereinthe non-transitory computer storage medium is incorporated into acomponent selected from the group consisting of an electronic chip, acomputer board, a central processing unit, a wireless communicationdevice, and a universal serial bus device.
 16. The storage device ofclaim 14 further comprising: an electronic chip incorporating thestorage device; an electronic tristate switch in the electronic chip;wherein the electronic tristate switch is configured to prevent accessto the secure key a second time.
 17. A storage device configured todecrypt software code stored in a random access memory of a computer,the storage device further configured to prevent a hacker code injectioninto a running process in a computer, the storage device comprising: anon-transitory computer storage medium, a central processing unit, adata bus, and an address bus; the non-transitory computer storage mediumcomprising a key usable for decrypting encrypted program code stored inthe random access memory, the key comprising a plurality of byteswherein each byte in the plurality of bytes has a byte value; thecentral processing unit connected to random access memory through thedata bus and the address bus; the central processing unit is programmedto: identify a designated location in the random access memory; fetch anencrypted byte from the designated location stored in the random accessmemory of the computer; perform a modulus operand between the byte valueof the encrypted byte and a length of the key to derive a remaindervalue; when the remainder value is zero, fetch the byte value of a lastbyte in the plurality of bytes of the key; when the remainder value isnon-zero value, fetch the byte value of the byte in the plurality ofbytes of the key, said byte located at the non-zero value; use the bytevalue that is fetched to decrypt the encrypted byte fetched from thedesignated location at the random access memory producing a decryptedbyte; and, use the decrypted byte.
 18. A method for controlling loadingof multiple operating systems into a random access memory of a computer,the computer comprising a first non-transitory computer storage medium,a second non-transitory computer storage medium, a third non-transitorycomputer storage medium, a random access memory, a central processingunit, a basic input/output system, and a switch, the method comprisingthe steps of: storing a key on the first non-transitory computer storagemedium, the key usable for encryption and decryption of a softwareprogram; storing an encrypted operating system on the computer in thesecond non-transitory computer storage medium; storing a non-encryptedoperating system on the computer in the third non-transitory computerstorage medium; setting the switch to enable the basic input/outputsystem to load either the encrypted operating system or thenon-encrypted operating system into the random access memory; andconfiguring the computer at power up to implement steps comprising:making the key available from the first non-transitory computer storagemedium to the basic input/output system; when the switch is set toenable the basic input/output system to load the encrypted operatingsystem, the basic input/output system reading the encrypted operatingsystem from the second non-transitory computer storage medium and usingthe key to decrypt the encrypted operating system as requested by thecentral processing unit; and, when the switch is set to enable the basicinput/output system to load the non-encrypted operating system from thethird non-transitory computer storage medium, the basic input/outputsystem disabling access to the key then reading the non-encryptedoperating system from the third non-transitory computer storage medium,then storing the non-encrypted operating system in the random accessmemory of the computer.